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ABSTRACT
A TUMULTUOUS UPHEAVAL AND TRANSFORMATION: THE IMPACT OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION ON THE BAHAMA ISLANDS
by
Ross Michael Nedervelt
University of New Hampshire, September, 2012

The position of the Bahama Islands on the periphery Britain's "Blue-Water
Empire," far removed from the American Revolution's pitched battles, did not allow the
colony to escape unaffected. Rather, the American Revolution had a significant impact on
the colony both during and after the conflict. The effects of the Continental Congress'
military and commercial policies towards the islands resulted in a political breakdown not
seen amongst the remaining loyal British colonies. Furthermore, the effects of the
Revolution did not end with the conflict, rather they continued for decades afterwards as
many displaced American Loyalists settled on the islands. The Loyalists immigration was
a revolution in its own, transforming the colony from impoverished economic stasis to a
booming frontier with the cotton and salt trades. Yet, the economic prosperity did not
last, and the colony had sunk into economic stasis by the mid-1830s.

vii

INTRODUCTION

On March 3rd, 1776, the Bahama Islands were dramatically catapulted into the
American Revolution. The American expedition to seize Nassau's stockpile of
gunpowder and ammunition threw Governor Montfort Browne into a blundering tizzy,
and resulted in public calls for his removal by the inhabitants. The dearth of trade brought
about by the mainland conflict plunged the islands into widespread famine, and drove
many Bahamians to obtain provisions by illicitly trading with the rebellious Americans.
The combination of ire against Governor Browne's actions during the American invasion
and his attempts to break the Bahamian-American trade would culminate in an
"unprecedented" political battle for control of the colony. Governor Browne dismissed
the General Assembly and the council to maintain authority; the council conspired to
launch a coup d'etat to remove Browne from power. 1
The Bahamas continued to be affected in the decades following the Revolution,
particularly as large numbers of Loyalist refugees and their slaves immigrated to the
colony. Situated between the newly emerging United States and the British West Indies,
the Bahamas became a Loyalist bulwark on the forefront of a newly reconfigured British
Atlantic World. As the Loyalists took hold of the colony it blossomed economically,
while strengthening its defenses and infrastructure, and was deeply altered culturally, as

1 Michael Craton. A History of the Bahamas (1962; reprint, Glasgow and London: Collins Clear-Type
Press, 1963). 149-160: Michael Craton and Gail Saunders, Islanders in the Stream: A History of the
Bahamian People. Volume One: From Aboriginal Times to the End of Slavery (Athens. GA and London:
The University of Georgia Press. 1999), 157-176.
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the worldview of the Loyalist refugees overwhelmed that held by the "old conchs" who
had long inhabited the archipelago. The sparks of the American Revolution set alight the
flames of chaotic political power struggles and socio-cultural transformations, which
significantly changed the islands over the course of almost sixty years.
The history of the Bahama Islands during this tumultuous era reveals how events
occurring across the Atlantic world affected the periphery of Britain's "Blue-Water
Empire." The situation of the Bahamas during the long eighteenth century was one
marked by severe poverty and economic boom, economic stasis and socio-racial
transformation, the production of raw materials and piracy-based entrepreneurialism, and
transformative and chaotic revolutions. Bahamian settlers had limited contact with Great
Britain: only a single merchant ship arrived in the archipelago each year for a majority of
the eighteenth century. Such limited contact with the metropole made the Bahamas the
epitome of neglect. Nevertheless, the islands were significantly impacted by the policies
and actions of the United States and Great Britain.
Being so neglected and lacking important cash crops for much of the eighteenth
century, the Bahamas were readily susceptible to influences originating elsewhere in the
Atlantic World. Of particular consequence were the effects of three revolutions that
transformed the British Atlantic World: the American Revolution, the Loyalist
Revolution, and the Emancipation Revolution. The Continental Congress' machinations
to secure munitions to support the Revolution instigated a breakdown of the Bahamas'
traditional political order not seen in any of the other loyal colonies in the British Atlantic
Empire. The breakdown of the Bahamian political system was accelerated by the
disastrous state of New Providence Island's defenses, which enabled the American forces
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to successfully capture the island in 1776, as well as the illicit trade in provisions between
the famished islanders and the American rebels. Loyalists from Georgia and South
Carolina fled to the Bahamas seeking a climate similar to that of the Lower South, which
would enable them to establish plantations and utilize slavery to cultivate cash crops.
Consequently, the southern Loyalists proceeded to transform the colony's economy,
material culture, social and racial demographics, and political environment. Then the
emancipation of the slaves on August 1st, 1834, brought an end to the plantation system
established by the Loyalists, and ended the economic boom fostered by Loyalist settlers
and cotton production. 2
While the effects of these revolutions on the Bahamas have been addressed by
scholars, historians have not fully realized the American Revolution's consequences for
the island chain. Of the three revolutions to affect the Bahamas, the Loyalist Revolution
has received the most discussion, particularly by Sandra Riley, who details the settlement
of Loyalist refugees and their struggle to survive economically. 3 Gail Saunders,
Whittington Bernard Johnson, and Howard Johnson have contributed immensely to
understanding the effects of Bahamian slave culture and the abolition of slavery on the
island economy and society. 4 Yet, the effects of the American Revolution and the

" Sandra Riley, Homeward Bound: A History of the Bahama Islands to 1850 with a Definitive Study of
Abaco in the American Loyalist Plantation Period (Miami: Island Research. 2000), 9-32, 47-61; Howard
Johnson, The Bahamas from Slavery to Servitude, 1783-1933 (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida,
1996), 193-202.
J

Riley, Homeward Bound, 124-134, 150-192, 193-202.

4 Craton

and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream: A Histoiy of the Bahamian People, Volume One, 213-232,
258-296, 297-334. 358-391. 392-396: Gail Saunders. Bahamian Loyalists and their Slaves (London:
MacMillan Caribbean. 1983): Gail Saunders. "Slavery and Cotton Culture in the Bahamas'" in Slaveiy
without Sugar: Diversity in Caribbean Economy and Society since the 17' h Century, ed. Verene A.
Shepherd (Gainesville. FL: University Press of Florida, 2002); Gail Saunders, Bahamian Society after
Emancipation (1990: reprint. Princeton. NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2003); Gail Saunders, Aspects of

3

Continental Congress' foreign policy on the Bahamas have been given little attention by
American and Bahamian scholars. 5 The American Revolution not only caused a dramatic
political confrontation within the Bahamian government, but made manifest the effects
that the conflict had on vulnerable peripheral colonies and served as a turning point for
the colony's economic fortunes.

Bahamian History: Loyalists, Slavery and Emancipation, Jimkanoo (Nassau: The Bahamas: Department of
Archives, Ministry of Education, 1991); Johnson, The Bahamas from Slavery to Servitude, 1-32, 47-82;
Whittington Bernard Johnson, Race Relations in the Bahamas, 1784-1834: The Nonviolent Transformation
from a Slave Society to a Free Society' (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 2000); Whittington
Bernard Johnson, Post-Emancipation Race Relations in the Bahamas (Gainesville, FL: University Press of
Florida, 2006). For archeological contributions to understanding Bahamian slavery and slave culture, see:
Laurie A Wilkie and Paul Farnsworth, Sampling Many Pots: An Archeology of Memory and Tradition at a
Bahamian Plantation (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2005).
?

Keith L. Tinker, The Bahamas in American History: From Early European Contact to Bahamian
Independence in 1973 (Lexington, KY: Xlibris Corporation, 2011), 19-24; Craton, A History of the
Bahamas, 153-161: James A. Lewis. The Final Campaign of the American Revolution: Rise and Fall of the
Spanish Bahamas (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991); Eric Beerman, "The Last
Battle of the American Revolution: Yorktown. No, the Bahamas!. (The Spanish-American Expedition to
Nassau in 1782)," The Americas 45. no. 1 (July, 1988), 79-95; Paul Albury, The Story of the Bahamas
(1975; reprint, London and Basingstoke. UK: MacMillan Publishers, 1984), 93-108.

4

Figure 1: Map of the western Atlantic world with the Bahama Islands displayed in the
center adjacent to the United States, Spanish Florida, and the Greater Antilles. 6

6

The West Indies, including Part of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia. East Florida, West
Florida. Louisiana, and the Gulf of Mexico, Map (London: John Cary Map and Printseller. 1783), from the
Library of Congress.
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CHAPTER I

JUST MAKING IT ON THE EDGE OF THE BLUE-WATER EMPIRE

In March 1773, the colony of the Bahama Islands stood in economic ruin. Its
already meager trade had vanished in the escalating tensions and boycotts of the Imperial
Crisis. The government found itself incapable of raising significant tax revenue to fund
the salaries of several officials. This necessitated the General Assembly and Governor
Thomas Shirley to submit a formal application to King George III humbly requesting an
"Annual provision" from "His Royal Bounty" to pay the remaining officials' salaries. 1
The economic crisis faced by the Bahama Islands during the Imperial Crisis developed
out of the convergence of the colony's natural and economic situations, and the political
and economic upheavals caused by the colonial protests to the metropole's new imperial
tax schemes.
Bahamians' memory of crisis and survival dictated solutions to serious problems
faced by generations of islanders during the eighteenth century. For the settlers, sailors,
and adventurers who colonized the Bahama Islands, the eighteenth century was an age of
prosperity and bankruptcy, war and peace, legal trade and piracy. These difficulties
shaped the actions of Bahamians as they attempted to survive and prosper on the edge of
Britain's vast Blue-Water Empire from the first English settlement in 1670 to the dawn of
the American Revolution. The methods and solutions the islanders developed in order to

1 The

Joint Address of the Council and Assembly of the Bahama Islands to Governor Shirley, C.O. 23/9/5.
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survive formed a basic knowledge that they could revert to when threatened by a new, but
parallel, danger. Periods of war, famine, economic depression, and trade stagnation saw
many turn to the practices of piracy, privateering, and smuggling carried out by their
forefathers.
Yet, the Imperial Crisis brought a whole new set of challenges as the colony
found itself split between a number of fundamental problems that traditional Bahamian
solutions could not easily address. The rising resentment to British influence and taxation
in colonial America coupled with the influence of Country Whig philosophy regarding
the colonial-metropole power theory, affected the colony's response to Whitehall's
decision to make the Turks and Caicos Islands a protectorate of the Bahamas. This
brought the wider concepts of taxation without representation and internal versus external
taxation to the Bahamas. The dramatic decline in trade stemming from boycotts of British
manufactured goods by mainland colonists depressed the Bahamian economy, raising
fears that the colony would have to be abandoned and causing attempts to establish free
ports to encourage trade to the colony-whether through honest practices or by smuggling.
Historical scholarship on the Bahamas' economic development during the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries has been

divided

between

general,

comprehensive analyses, and specialized discussions on a single aspect of the economy.
Michael Craton and Gail Saunders have provided a comprehensive overview of how
early settlers and adventurers attempted to survive and derive profit from the islands
through small-scale farming, piracy and smuggling, salt raking, timber harvesting,
"turtling," and wrecking. 2 Patrice Williams' in-depth scholarship on Bahamian trade and
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economics prior to the American Revolution has focused principally on the salt trade, and
how this influenced the Bahamas' relationship with the Turks and Caicos Islands. 3
However, Craton, Saunders, and Williams offer only general information on the
colonists' attempts to establish sugar, cotton, and coffee plantations for staple trade crops.
Illicit actions taken by the Bahamians, particularly piracy, have been the subject of
extensive scholarly discussion by David Cordingly and Colin Woodard. 4 These works
focus principally on the actions and events of individual pirates and their crews, but they
do not address the overarching socio-economic effects piracy had on the impoverished
inhabitants of the Bahamians. Outside of this standard analysis, Virgil Henry Storr's
scholarship interprets Bahamian piracy as a "way of doing business" and "piratical

2

Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream: A History of the Bahamian People, Volume One, 74-103,
115-176; Craton, A History of the Bahamas, 41-16, 100-161.

3 The Salt Industry of the Bahamas (Nassau, The Bahamas: Public Records Office, Archives Section,
Ministry of Education and Culture, 1980); Patrice M. Williams, "The Politics of Salt: The Turks & Caicos
Islands Issue 1764-1848" (M.Phil, thesis, University of the West Indies, 2002); Gwendolyn F. FonsecaElphick, "Salt Island: Grand Turk in the 18 t h Century: A Thesis" (M.A. thesis, State University of New
York College at Oneonta, 1997); Carlton Mills, History of the Turks & Caicos Islands (Oxford: MacMillan
Education, 2008); Larry G. Bowman, "The Scarcity of Salt in Virginia during the American Revolution,"
The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 11, no. 4 (October, 1969): 464-472; Craton and Saunders,
Islanders in the Stream: A Histoiy of the Bahamian People, Volume One; Craton, A History of the
Bahamas.

4 Kris E. Lane, Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas, 1500-1750, Latin American Realities
(Armonk, NY and London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998); Daniel Defoe. A General History of the Pyrates, ed.
Manuel Schonhorn (1972; reprint, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications. Inc., 1999): Virgil Henry Storr,
Enterprising Slaves and Master Pirates: Understanding Economic Life in the Bahamas (New York: Peter
Lang Publishing, Inc., 2004); David Cordingly. Pirate Hunter of the Caribbean: The Adventurous Life of
Captain Woodes Rogers (New York: Random House, 2011); David Cordingly. Under the Black Flag: The
Romance and the Reality of Life among the Pirates (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2006);
Colin Woodard. The Republic of Pirates: Being the True and Surprising Ston• of the Caribbean Pirates and
the Man Who Brought Them Down (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, Inc.. 2007): George Woodbury. The Great
Days of Piracy in the West Indies (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1951); Violet Barbour.
"Privateers and Pirates of the West Indies." The American Historical Review 16. no. 3 (April, 191 1): 529566.

8

enterprise," because "no non-piratical enterprise" was as economically successful for the
inhabitants. 5
The economic and political situation that placed the Bahamas on the periphery of
the British Empire during the Imperial Crisis has been addressed in several important
ways. Gail Saunders and Michael Craton have framed the historical dialogue in terms of
an economic struggle for survival as the Bahamas was isolated commercially by
American protests against the Stamp and Townshend acts. 6 William McClellan, Andrew
Jackson O'Shaughnessy, and Donna Spindel have devoted little attention to the
Bahamian experience during the Crisis. Rather they have focused principally on
smuggling, and the wider effects of British tax policy and colonial protest in the major
colonies of the British Caribbean and American mainland. 7 Yet, as Patrice Williams
notes in "The Politics of Salt," the consequences of British colonial tax policy and the
Bahamian struggle for economic survival had important influence on the internal debate
over the Bahamian-Turks colonial relationship. 8 By focusing on how the Imperial Crisis
affected peripheral British colonies, such as the Bahama Islands, in terms of how it
influenced political dialogue and economic crises, a more nuanced understanding of how

Storr, Enterprising Slaves and Master Pirates, 44, 51-52.
6 Craton, A History of the Bahamas, 149-153; Craton and Saunders. Islanders in the Stream: A Histoiy of
the Bahamian People, Volume One, 160-164.

Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British
Caribbean (Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000); Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy.
"The Stamp Act Crisis in the British Caribbean," The William and Maty Quarterly 51, no. 2 (April, 1994):
203-226; Donna J. Spindel, "The Stamp Act Crisis in the British West Indies," The William and Mary
Quarterly 11, no. 2 (August, 1977): 203-221; William S. McClellan. Smuggling in the American Colonies
at the Outbreak of the Revolution, with Special Reference to the West Indies Trade (New York: The Moffat,
Yard and Company. 1912).
s

Williams. "The Politics of Salt," 57-72.

9

these colonies reacted to the effects of the American Revolution in the Atlantic World
can be created.

Surviving physically and economically on the Bahama Islands depended
primarily on the colony's environmental, geological, and geographical characteristics and
issues. The position of the archipelago bordering the Strait of Florida and the Windward
Passage made the islands an important station for colonial shipping between British
North America and the West Indies, in addition to a critical military asset that could
guard supply routes and launch raids against enemy vessels. This allowed piracy,
smuggling, and wrecking to thrive, and brought commercial vessels to the colony. Yet,
the Bahamas' poor soil hindered its ability to produce significant quantities of sugar cane,
cotton, coffee beans, and other commercial cash crops. The archipelago was relegated to
secondary status by the metropole, which idealized the wealth producing sugar colonies
of Barbados and Jamaica. Bahamians managed to just make it in the British Atlantic
World by harvesting timber and quality hardwoods, marketing native fruits and turtle
meat, and raking salt.
The Bahama Islands' geological and environmental situation varied significantly
from the principal sugar colonies constituting the Leeward and Windward Islands.
Instead of mountainous islands with lush vegetation and rich soil deposits, the Bahamas
were not much more than glorified sand bars. Many of the colony's islands towered no
higher than 100 feet above sea level, but these were dwarfed by the other British West
Indian islands-ranging from 1,120 feet (Barbados) to 7,402 feet (Jamaica) above the

10

ocean's surface. 9 The archipelago's predominately flat nature coupled with the "porosity
of the rock," consisting mainly of limestone and coral sand covered by a meager layer of
fertile soil or dispersed amongst the rocks in "banana holes," resulted in "absolutely no
rivers or streams" flowing within the islands. 10 In some areas rocks, caves, and deep
"potholes" marked the landscape, and freshwater lay near the surface above the
"underlying salt water." 11 This made farming quite difficult, particularly for the largescale plantation style of agriculture production akin to those used in Virginia, South
Carolina, and Jamaica, because of the lack of deep fertile land that could hold freshwater
and the serious risk of killing crops with brackish well-water.
These circumstances directed and limited the actions made by the Bahamians in
their efforts to create a prosperous colonial economy, and sustain long-term colonial
settlements. Early records of trade occurring during the early eighteenth century show
that the inhabitants traded turtle meat and indigenous fruits with South Carolinian traders
for victuals and supplies. New Providence Island's "natural produce" included sugar
cane, cotton, "mahogany, cedar and pine" for "ship building," "lignum vitae, brown
ebony and various dye woods," a variety of fruits, and pineapples that were the "best kind
in America." 12 Furthermore, only 800 of New Providence's approximately 51,100 acres

9

Craton, A History of the Bahamas, 11; Paulette Anne Bethel-Daly, "Uneven Development in the
Bahamas: Past and Present" (Ph.D. diss.. University of Massachusetts, 1980), 39-40.

111 George Burbank Shattuck and Benjamin LeRoy Miller, "Physiography and Geology of the Bahama
Islands" in The Bahama Islands, ed. George Burbank Shattuck (New York: The MacMillan Company.
1905), 13; Governor Shirley's Answers to 19 Queries relating to His Majesty's Bahama Islands from the
Right Honorable Earl of Dartmouth, C.O. 23/22/59-72.

11

Ibid.. 11-12.

i : Cordingly, Pirate Hunter of the Caribbean. 230: "Queries from the Board of Trade for the year 1728."
C.O. 23/14/66.

11

were under cultivation. 13 This sustained a population, calculated by Governor George
Phenney in 1722, of "427 whites and 233 blacks" on New Providence, as well as an
additional 286 whites and 42 blacks spread across Eleuthera, Harbour Island, and Cat
Island. 14
Trade between Bahamians, Great Britain, and other British American colonies
was limited during the early eighteenth

century. During Governor

Phenney's

administration, a "typical year" saw "only one ship" carrying goods arrive directly from
Great Britain. 15 In 1728 and 1729, only "about 20 but very small" Bahamian vessels were
engaged in trade. 16 The majority of these vessels sailed to South Carolina offering
"Maddara [sic] and Mohoggony [sic] wood, turtle, lemons, oranges, [and] pine apples" in
exchange for provisions, while others imported "rum and molasses" and other goods
from Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua, Havana, and Hispaniola. 17 Yet, this meager trade
contributed little to the overall wealth of the colony, generating approximately £104 10s.
3d. in revenue between 1728 and 1729. 18 Comparatively, the income of the Bahamas'
colonial government in a single year amounted to less than one-tenth of one percent of
the £11,174 6s. 6d. incurred from the 2s. 6d. tax levied by Barbados during the same

13

Cordingly, Pirate Hunter of the Caribbean, 230.
Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream: A History of the Bahamian People, Volume One, 119-120.

"ibid., 132.
16 "Mr. Fitzwilliam, Surveyor General of the Customs for the Southern Continent of America, to the
Commissioners of the Customs. New Providence. 30 lh June. 1729" in America and the West Indies, 17281729, vol. 36 of Calendar of State Papers: Colonial Series, ed. Cecil Headlam (1937; reprint, Vaduz,
Lichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, Ltd.. 1964). 487-488. From this point forward the citation Calendar of State
Papers: Colonial Series will be abbreviated as CSP.CS.

17

Ibid.. 487-488; "List of ships entered and cleared at New Providence. 26 lh Dec.. 1728 - 25 ,h March.
1729" in America and the West Indies. 172H-1729. vol. 36 of CSP. CS. ed. Cecil Headlam. 363.

IX "Treasurer's account of public funds'" in America and the West Indies, I 72H-I729, vol. 36 of CSP:CS. ed.
Cecil Headlam. 325.

12

period, and approximately one-and-one-third percent of Virginia's total revenue of
£7,736 Ss. 2'/W.19
While the colony and its inhabitants did not derive much wealth from direct trade,
many benefited from vessels traversing Bahamian waters. The shifting sand bars, lowlying cays, rocky coral reefs, and treacherous Caribbean storms brought wealth to the
inhabitants through the misfortunes of mariners from around the Atlantic. The loss or
grounding of merchant and treasure ships on the Bahamian reefs provided inhabitants
with lucrative careers in salvaging their cargos. Spanish ships were an especially favorite
target of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Bahamians. They brought handsome sums
to the destitute islanders that "could yield more returns than years of labor ashore." 20
Bermudian Richard Richardson and a small company of men netted "a share of silver that
weighed about 1400 pieces of eight" and "80 lb. a share" in cargo totaling approximately
"£2,600" from the wreck of a Spanish vessel on Man Island during the summer of
1657.

91

While most wrecks did not yield similar riches, the prospect of improving one's

financial and material well-being in the impoverished colony was enough to draw
Bahamian wreckers to a sunken vessel like insects to a rotting corpse.

99

19

"Treasure's account of the 2s. 6d. levy for year ending 30th Sept., 1729." in America and the West Indies,
1728-1729, vol. 36 of CSP.CS. ed. Cecil Headlam, 347; "Account of H.M. Revenue of Virginia. 25th Oct.
1727 - 25th April, 1728." in America and the West Indies, 1728-1729, vol. 36 of CSP. CS, ed. Cecil
Headlam, 127.
20

Craton and Saunders. Islanders in the Stream: A History of the Bahamian People, Volume One. 86-87.

:i

W. Hubert Miller. "The Colonization of the Bahamas, 1647-1670." The William and Mary Quarterly 2,
no. 1 (January, 1945): 41-42: Sir John H. Lefroy. Memorials of the Discovery and Early Settlement of the
Bermudas or Somers Islands, 1511-1687 (1879; reprint, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode Limited, 1932),
2:112-113: Riley. Homeward Bound. 32-33.

" 2 Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream: A History of the Bahamian People, Volume One. 87;
James M. Wright. "The Wrecking System of the Bahama Islands." Political Science Quarterly 30, no. 4
(December, 1915): 618-644.

13

Attempts were made to establish cotton and tobacco plantations in the Bahamas
stretching from the Carolina Lords Proprietors' rule that lasted from 1670 to 1706, all the
way to the early days of the American Revolution. But, like many early English settlers
of the Leeward and Windward Islands, they met limited results. 23 Tobacco and sugar
were grown principally for "local consumption," with little-to-none being exported from
the colony, and the fine cotton produced was not enough to develop an "export trade" of
any significance. 24 Inhabitants' attempts to establish sugar plantations met with little
success because of the "want of hands and money to erect works and buildings." 25
The cultivation of agricultural lands on the islands was further complicated by the
Lords Proprietors' rules regarding land tenure, which drastically limited the ability of the
islanders to claim title to plots of land. 26 When Charles II granted the Bahama Islands to
six of the eight Lords Proprietors of Carolina, the Proprietors were empowered to grant
lands to the settlers, appoint governors to oversee the colony, and collect various forms of
taxation. 27 During the rule of the Lords Proprietors they reserved "two-fifths of all land"

2 3 Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713
(1972; reprint, Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1973), 53-54, 61, 168-171;
Angela Lakwete, Inventing the Cotton Gin: Machine and Myth in Antebellum America, Johns Hopkins
Studies in the History of Technology (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003),
23-24.

:4

Ibid., 82.

"Mr. Fitzwilliam. Surveyor General of the Customs for the Southern Continent of America, to the
Commissioners of the Customs. New Providence. 30 Ih June, 1729" in America and the West Indies, 172H1729, vol. 36 of CSP.CS. ed. Cecil Headlam. 488.
: 6 Craton

and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream: A Histoiy of the Bahamian People, Volume One, 164-165;
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for themselves, and had the principal power to grant land to colonists-which were
awarded in "less suitable]...twelve-hundred-acre squares." 28 The twelve-hundred-acre
plots, consisting of sporadic banana holes and thin layers of fertile soil, could not provide
enough nutrients to effectively cultivate cash crops. These land tenure policies continued
after the Crown's assumption of the colony's governance in 1718, signaled by the
installation of Captain Woodes Rogers as the colony's first royal governor. Not until the
large influx of persons and capital from the Loyalist exodus in the sunset years of the
Revolution were the Bahamas Islands capable of producing anything above self-sufficient
subsistence agriculture-an activity regarded by the islanders as a "necessary evil" for
29

nearly a century-and-a-half.

This differs dramatically from the sugar production in the British West Indies
during the eighteenth century. In 1700, British West Indian sugar colonies of Barbados,
Jamaica, and the Leeward Islands produced 12,170 tons, 4,474 tons, and 6,812 tons
respectively. 30 Barbados led the way in sugar exports to Britain with approximately
£316,000 in 1700, with Jamaican and Leeward Island exports amounting to £201,400 and
£192,000. 31 Export estimations indicate that sugar products accounted for "93 percent of
the total exports of Barbados, 99 percent for Antigua, 92 percent for St. Kitts, and 89
percent for Jamaica" well into 17 70. 32 The colony of Granada expanded its sugar output,
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and the value of its exports rose dramatically from £62,915 in 1763 to £859,981 in 1773,
which made it the "second most valuable colony in the British Caribbean." 33 Exports
from Jamaica, the crown jewel of the British West Indies, rose significantly from
1,851,481 gallons of rum to 2,169,482 gallons and 1,359,621 hundredweight of sugar to
1,746,990 hundredweight between 1763 and 1775. 34 Overall, the value of sugar exported
from the British West Indies to Britain "increased from £1,994,654 in 1763 to £2,666,052
sterling in 1773." 35
The islands' secondary status within the Atlantic World meant the British
government neglected to ensure its proper defense. They contributed little to the
maintenance of fortifications on New Providence Island, and consequently Fort Nassau
and Fort Montagu remained dilapidated throughout much of the eighteenth century. In
1721, Fort Nassau's cannon carriages had rotted to the point where twenty-four had
collapsed, in addition to three more that collapsed when their cannons were fired, leaving
the cannons "lying uselessly on the ground." 36 Despite its position guarding the Straits of
Florida and the Windward Passage, the archipelago was inadequately garrisoned to repel
French and Spanish attacks. Defending the colony fell on the shoulders of an independent
company of British soldiers consisting of a force of "110 men including officers" in the
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1720s, which dwindled to a mere "twenty-three men" following the French and Indian
War and then to thirteen men in 1773-all of whom were stationed on New Providence. 37
While Britain's colonial administration did not view the archipelago in the same
light as they did the sugar islands, the Bahamas did generate one product in high demand
by the Empire: salt. During the early eighteenth century it was estimated that the salt
raked on the Bahamas was sufficient enough to "furnish the new plantations and colonies
on the north American coast." 38 Exuma, Ragged Island, Long Island, Inagua, and the
more remote Turks Island, were ideal locations for raking and shipping salt because of
their low elevation, natural forming salt ponds, and their close proximity to the mainland
and British trade routes. Consequently, the islands attracted seasonal Bermudian and
Bahamian workers looking to earn income or barter the salt for trade goods and
provisions with vessels from other British American colonies.
The exportation of salt from the Bahamas played an important role in commercial
trade in the British Atlantic World. Salt became a particularly important resource for
colonists in New England and the Canadian Maritimes, who utilized it to preserve fish
and other meats for shipment to the British Isles and the West Indies. 39 Historian Michael
Jarvis has noted that the New England colonies and Newfoundland "consumed more than
half a million bushels a year" during the 1740s alone. 40 As a result of the need for salt as
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a commercial good, Bahamians increasingly engaged in a competitive collection and
trade in the mineral with migrant Bermudians who raked salt on the Out Islands and
Turks Island. A "conservative estimate" given by the Bermudian assembly in 1764 put
the worth of the salt trade coming out of the Bahamas at "£20,000 sterling a year" and,
based on prices for a bushel of salt in mainland America and the average carrying
capacity of Bermudian vessels, the typical "sailor-raker" could earn approximately £15£20 per voyage. 41
The Bahama Islands also produced large amounts of wood for sale to Britain and
the mainland colonies. Native Bahamian woods were highly valued for their use in
manufacturing fine furniture, textile dyeing, and ship building. The harvesting of
Bahamian logwoods and dyewoods formed the islands' "first exports" of significance
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. British and American fine furniture
manufacturers' thirst for large quantities of mahogany caused it to supersede American
walnut and oak as the material of choice by the 1730s, and consequentially further
opened up the timber industry as an important aspect of Bahamian commerce. 42
Inhabitants relied on the salt, timber, and wrecking industries during the first half
of the eighteenth century during periods of economic prosperity. However, when times
became tough or empires clashed, the inhabitants regularly resorted to piracy and
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privateering, which served as their "definite model for economic success...ever since the
17 th century." 43
The lack of major interaction with the British government and military,
particularly during the early-eighteenth century, and the geographical nature of the
Bahama Islands enabled piracy and smuggling to flourish. The many uninhabited islands,
inlets, and cays provided the perfect cover necessary to hide hostile ships and contraband
goods. Furthermore, the absence of a strong British naval presence in Bahamian waters,
as well as the crumbling state of Fort Nassau, allowed pirates to sail and shelter amongst
the islands and ports uninhibited for years. As a result, from 1706 to 1718 the "golden
age of piracy" saw the Bahamas become, as historian George Woodbury aptly put it, "the
Pirate Republic of New Providence." 44
Despite their dangerous and illegitimate nature, piracy and smuggling brought
needed income into the colony and facilitated a period of economic growth during the
War of Jenkins' Ear, King George's War, and the French and Indian War. The prevalence
of persistent "poverty, lack of resources, and the heartbreaking drudgery of alternative
occupations" made the prospect of "instant or easy riches" quite alluring. 45 Wartime
proved to be especially lucrative for Bahamians engaged in piracy and privateering, and
in 1748 Governor John Tinker commented that "New Providence had 'increased most
surprisingly in strength and wealth.'" 46 During the War of Jenkins' Ear prosperity flowed
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into the colony in the form of plunder and prizes, which fueled personal and public
growth to the point "that some of the new homes and houses of business" were '"called
sumptuous in the Indies.'" 47 However, the good times of pirating and plunder were about
to come to an abrupt end following the French and Indian War, and would quickly be
displaced by economic depression and bankruptcy which threatened the Bahamas' very
existence.

The Imperial Crisis following the French and Indian War created a politically and
financially turbulent environment for the Bahama Islands, which saw the colony and its
inhabitants take several different political and financial actions that straddled the growing
rift between colonial British America and the metropole. The first major instance came in
the growing internal debate over the role of the Turks and Caicos Islands within the
greater Bahamian archipelago-which lasted until 1848 when the Turks and Caicos
became an independent colony within the British Empire. This debate served as a
microcosm for the larger imperial dispute between the American colonies and Parliament
over the metropole's ability to levy internal taxes on the colonists without direct
representation. The second action saw the colony request a financial grant from the
Crown in 1773 to pay its colonial officials and personnel, since tax revenues were so
meager the Bahamian government found itself incapable of paying them. Further actions
involved the attempt to establish Nassau and Turks Island as "free ports," the inhabitants'
participation in illicit trading, and the protesting of tax policies implemented by the
metropole.
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In the wake of the French and Indian War, a triumphant and bankrupt Imperial
Britain sought to effectively secure its American colonies while climbing out of its
monstrous war debt. The French military operations during the war spurred the British
government to increase its military presence throughout British North America and the
West Indies, which largely remained in place following the conflict's end in February
1763. The French capture of Turks Island in June 1764 by Admiral d'Estaing, committed
with the knowledge that France and Great Britain were now at peace, attempted to break
the British control of the Windward Passage and shutdown the Jamaica trade. While
Admiral d'Estaing's assault was vociferously condemned by both London and Paris, it
exposed the need for a strong British military presence in America following the war.
Chief administrative officials at Whitehall and on the frontbenches of Parliament
endeavored to secure the borderlands of Indian Territory with regular troops, while
fundamentally changing the transatlantic tax policy in order to pay down the debt and
provide colonial security. This was a marked change from the previous century-and-ahalf of colonial American policy of minimally intrusive oversight, to attempting to play
an instrumental role in the American colonies. Yet, the taxation policies pushed by the
administrations between 1764 and 1775 caused a detrimental shock to the British colonial
system, and set the Empire on a course for international civil war. 48
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Parliament's taxation policies deeply affected the economic and political realities
of British America. Lord Grenville's implementation of the Stamp Act in 1765 created an
internal tax on British paper goods, legal documents, and nearly all means of written
communication in the colonies. 49 This aroused protests and sympathies across the North
American and Caribbean colonies because of the Act's universal application to all British
colonies, and the direct taxation of British subjects without their due consent. 50
Arguments made against the implementation of the Stamp Act by the colonists targeted
the method of "internal" taxation, which opponents claimed Parliament did not have the
right to force on the colonies. 51 Only with direct representation in the House of Commons
would direct internal taxation by the British government be justified. However, this was
rebuffed with the assertion that all British colonists were "virtually" represented in
Parliament. 52 The passage of the Townshend Duties in 1767 by the Chatham
administration renewed the protests and heated political language of the Stamp Act
Crisis, but the mainland colonists' protests expanded beyond effigy burnings and riots to
incorporate widespread boycotts through the non-importation and non-consumption
agreements.
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The Stamp Act of 1765 caused a deep crisis in Britain's Atlantic Empire, and
changed the way colonists understood political roles and relationships. The colonial and
British philosophies surrounding colonial taxation and parliamentary representation did
not just exist at the Atlantic World level, but played a significant role in relations between
organized colonies and ambiguous territories within the Empire. Colonial reaction to the
Stamp Act on the mainland produced hostile confrontations with royal officials and
designated stamp collectors. In New York and Boston riotous mobs tore down collection
offices, destroyed stamps, and threatened royal officials, while rioters in St. Kitts burned
over £2,000 worth of stamps. 53
However, the Bahamas avoided much of the chaos accompanying the mainland
protests. The only individual designated to administer the Stamp Act was Governor
Shirley, and the stamps allocated to the islands "comprised the second smallest shipments
sent to any American colony." Reports from American captains travelling through the
Bahamas in December 1765 expressed that "stamped papers were unavailable at New
Providence," and that commerce continued "as usual." Furthermore, of all the West
Indian colonies, the Bahamas was the only one to return all of its stamps intact to
London. 54
Although the use of the stamps does not appear to have occurred in the Bahamas,
the colony might have seen some intimidation of stamp collectors to ensure that they
were never distributed. One "unconfirmed report" that appeared in "one northern
newspaper" detailed that a group of inhabitants from New Providence requested that the
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stamp distributor resign, but when he refused they "forced him into a coffin, nailed it
shut, lowered it into the ground and covered it with 2 shovelfulls [sic] of dirt" causing
him to resign. However, reports given by Governor Shirley indicate that "the Government
remained in a perfect undisturbed State," and there was no increase of British troops or
ships in the Bahamas. While it does not appear that the Bahamas experienced the effects
of the Stamp Act in as severe a manner as the mainland colonies, it significantly impacted
the colony's internal policies and ideological debates. 55
A critical case study can be found in how the Bahamian colonial government and
the Board of Trade conceptualized where the Turks and Caicos Islands existed within the
British Empire, particularly in the debate over who held jurisdictional authority over the
islands. The French capture of Turks Island gave the Bahamas an advantage over the
Bermudians in their attempt to control the islands. Governor Shirley argued that the
islands should be incorporated into the Bahamas in order to be more effectively defended
by the Royal Navy, which could be comfortably stationed at Great Exuma-an "ideal
base." 56 This would tighten control over the Windward Passage against a possible French
assault on "English cruisers" and merchant vessels, and further aggressive actions against
British colonists.

57

The British colonial administration concurred with Governor Shirley,

and determined that the Turks and Caicos Islands would be governed directly by the
Bahamas. This gave the colonial Bahamian government full power to legislate for, tax,
and regulate the inhabitants and commercial activities of Turks Island regardless of actual
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representation within the General Assembly. 58 The ability to tax and regulate a great
proportion of the salt raking and trade occurring on Turks Island would bring much
needed income into Bahamian coffers, while simultaneously attempting to drive off the
interloping Bermudian salt rakers and traders operating on the island. 59
However, the Bahamian General Assembly's Lower House took the moral highground. The Lower House's twenty-four members refused to legislate and approve taxes
on the approximately twenty-five white male inhabitants despite Governor Shirley and
Lord Hillsborough's arguments that the Turks Islanders were virtually represented-like
the colonists living on Exuma and Cat Island who did not have elected representatives. 60
Siding with their follow colonists on the mainland and in the West Indies protesting
direct internal taxation, the assemblymen argued that they did not possess "any right to
make Laws particularly for the government of Turks Island, as they have not any
Representatives in this House." 61 This argument is underscored by their assertion that
representation in the colonial legislature was a rightful "Priviledge [sic]" the Turks
Islanders had, because they were "in Number and consequence sufficient to be
represented in any House of Assembly in America." 62 As a result the Lower House could
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not in good conscience approve of imposing the colony's "Interiour Policy" on the Turks
Islanders until they were permitted to do so by the Crown. Nevertheless, this still left
open the colony's ability to enforce the Imperial laws and policies, since the Turks and
Caicos Islands now fell under their preview according to the Board of Trade. 63
While the mainland American colonies and West Indian sugar colonies
experienced dramatic growth in importation and consumption of British manufactured
goods going into the Imperial Crisis, trade to the Bahamas languished. 64 In a letter
written in December 1768 by Governor Thomas Shirley to Lord Hillsborough, Shirley
plainly states that "Alarms" were being raised by the inhabitants over the "languid State
of Trade" that the islands depended on for "their very Existence." 65 As a result of the
dreadful trade situation, a deeply troubled Shirley stressed that "many Families have, and
still continue to remove from [the Bahamas] to the Continent and Neighboring Islands." 66
The regiment of British Regulars garrisoned on New Providence following the war had
been dramatically depleted to merely "twenty-three men" from an original "Independent
Company of One Hundred and fifty Men."
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"very bold [and] daring Spirit." 68 The impoverished nature of the colonists, coupled with
the lack of any staple crop produced in the archipelago and the threat of being unable to
maintain domestic tranquility, caused the colony that had "been upon the decline ever
since the Peace" to face the serious possibility of soon being "abandoned." 69
In an attempt to prevent the Bahama Islands from becoming a ghost colony,
Governor Shirley floated the idea of "Opening the Port of New Providence" to foreign
commerce. The establishment of New Providence Island as a British free port would
entice Bahamians intending to permanently leave the colony to remain, while
encouraging other colonists and settlers to "resort hither." The advent of foreign ships
meant greater commerce with other colonies in British America whose merchants and
consumers sought legal means of obtaining various kinds of foreign manufactured goods
and produce. For Shirley and the Bahamians, opening up the port would "make these
Islands flourish and render them very usefull [sic] to the Mother Country." Even "a few
Years," the governor estimated, would keep the colony afloat and effectively allow local
cotton and coffee production to expand and develop into suitable cash crops.

70

Yet, while

the establishment of New Providence as a free port did come to pass, the flow of legal
British and colonial American commercial trade quickly dried up as the mainland
colonists took aggressive action against British policy through numerous boycotts of
imported manufactured goods and produce.
The various protests, boycotts, and non-consumption agreements against British
goods by the mainland colonies saw Atlantic trade and colonial tax revenues decline in
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the Bahamas. Colonial uproar against the implementation of the Townshend Duties had
the strongest effect on the decline of transatlantic British commerce, which resulted in a
dramatic drop in Britain's export trade to the thirteen colonies. Prior to the widespread
implementation of boycotts in the thirteen colonies in 1768, British exports earned
approximately £15,100,000 in 1768, but this had tumbled to £13,400,000 a year later for
a "decline of only 38 per cent."

71

Through its various public and commercial taxes the

Bahamas' Public Treasury only contained a "lordly total" of £144 Is. IVid. in December
1768-a meager sum that would evaporate as the boycotts dragged on. 72
In an attempt to stem the loss of trade, Bahamians and Turks Islanders changed
their modus operandi from sanctioned trade with the British American mainland and the
West Indian colonies to illicit trade with the Dutch, French, and Spanish West Indies.
This was particularly true for the salt rakers on Turks Island, who unofficially established
the island as a free port sometime between 1765 and 1767. The free port allowed victuals
and timber from mainland British America to be exchanged for sugar products, wine, and
slaves from the non-British West Indies.

7 -5

Yet, many of these goods never reached the

island's shore; rather, they were transferred from foreign vessels to British vessels and
vice versa without going through the official importation procedures. 74 Furthermore,
according to Samuel Gambier's observations regarding the Turks Island smuggling
operations, British vessels bound for the mainland colonies loaded with "foreign
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Produce" and other "customable [and] prohibited commodities" often took on a "quantity
of Salt, which they most likely reported [as their main cargo] on their return." 75 This
allowed smugglers to effectively disguise their cargoes, particularly in the case of foreign
sugar, as salt in order to avoid paying import duties at British-American ports.
Bahamian officials also encouraged the establishment of Turks Island as a free
port in an attempt to boost trade. Andrew Symmer, Governor Shirley's personally
appointed agent to the island, was very open in his advocacy for establishing Turks Island
as a free port-especially since he was a chief participant in the ongoing illicit trade.
Symmer permitted numerous vessels of "all nations" to freely come to the island "to sell
or barter away their Cargoes for anything they could get in exchange." 76 Since Turks
Island was a British possession and not a free port established by the British Government
the trade carried out there was in "open Violation of the grand Act of Navigation," and an
assumption of "the legislative power" with the act of "opening a free port." 77 However, it
was quite prosperous with over two hundred vessels from the principal port cities across
colonial America conducting commerce at the island between 1768 and 1769. 78 Since the
trade occurred off the books, the illicit free trade did not translate into increased revenues
for the Bahamian colonial government-rather, the inhabitants and local officials pocketed
the proceeds.
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The use of the Bahamas and Turks Island as conduits for smuggling illegal
foreign goods to the mainland colonies increased tensions during the Imperial Crisis, but
as the American non-importation and non-consumption movements took hold, smuggling
through the Bahamas dried up. American smuggling of foreign products raised the ire of
royal governors, tax collectors, and the West Indies lobby, which consequently fueled
distrust of American colonists by officials in Whitehall and Parliament. The imposition of
a 3d. per gallon tax on foreign molasses by the Sugar Act, designed to raise an estimated
£78,000 per year, yielded "only £5,200 in 1764 and £4,090 in 1765." 79 The failure to
create revenue stemmed from "the continuance of widespread smuggling." 80 The
establishment of the non-importation and non-consumption agreements made by colonial
American merchants and consumers briefly opened up the Bahamian and Turks routes to
bring boycotted and foreign manufactured goods into the mainland colonies. This was
quite clear to Bahamian officials who noted that the supply of illegal foreign
manufactured goods would be "to the great prejudice of the Mother Country," and would
work in "upholding... the American merchants in their Resolution of Non-Importation." 81
Yet, as the non-importation and non-consumption movements advanced, the mainland
colonists cut themselves off from both legal and illegal imported goods, reasoning that
"the importation of these articles would have sooner or later benefited.. .England." 82
Dwindling trade, meager colonial revenues, and the crumbling defensive
infrastructure reached a crisis point in 1773. In a humble and flattering letter to King
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George III, the General Assembly and Governor's Council laid out the economic realities
the Bahamas faced on the eve of the American Revolution. The decline in trade caused
the colony's revenue to be "almost annihilated," the "Treasury exhausted," and the
government unable to pay the basic salaries of the officers and officials. Attempts to raise
funds through the use of "heavy imposts" only resulted in reducing the inhabitants to a
state of "Extreme poverty." Native woods that the colony's "Exports chiefly consisted]"
had "become so scarce and the value so depreciated" the industry could not generate a
serious profit. Governor Shirley estimated that the total value of the colony's exports to
Britain "amounted to about £2450 Sterling" in 1771, and "to scarcely £1750 Sterling" in
the following year. Even laying taxes on British goods and manufactures, as "in
consequence of Orders from your Majesty's Ministers," was whole-heartedly rejected,
since these goods along with provisions brought from neighboring colonies formed the
entirety of the colony's imports. 83
This put the General Assembly and Governor Shirley into a serious predicament.
In an address to the governor, the assembly and council plainly stated that the colony's
situation was so dire they had to seek financial assistance from the Crown. "We...pray,"
declared the gravely concerned officials, that the King "will out of His Royal Bounty
order such an Annual provision for the Judges of the Courts, the Attorney General, and
such other Civil Officers within this Government as...shall seem necessary." 84 In their
letter the assembly and council included a detailed accounting of the salaries and
perquisites of the judges, attorney general, provost marshal, and secretary that showed the

To the King's Most Excellent Majesty. CO. 23/9/53-54: Governor Shirley's Answers to 19 Queries
relating to His Majesty's Bahama Islands from the Right Honorable Earl of Dartmouth. C.O. 23/22/59-72.
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colonial government owed approximately £87 10s. in salaries to its officials, as well as an
additional £140 in perquisites for the fiscal year. 85
The £227 10s. shortfall amounted to approximately eleven percent of the £2065
Is. \WAd. in

revenue raised for 1772, and an equal percentage of the £2033 18s. 10Vid. in
O/T

expenditures for the same year.

Because of the limited intercolonial trade and the lack

of a sufficient cash crop to generate revenue, the Bahamian government could not
implement an emergency levy to raise revenue. The implementation of higher taxes on
imports, exports, or the inhabitants seriously jeopardized losing what trade did manage to
flow to the remote colony's islands. Consequently, seeking assistance from the Crown
was the only course of action left.
However, the financial safety-net of the King's "Royal Bounty" was severely
depleted, and unable to keep the Bahamian government from going bankrupt.

07

The fund

available for the colonial economic assistance was "so low as to barely answer the
present charges upon it," and fulfilling the request would leave the fund virtually
empty. 88 Consequently, the Bahamian request for financial assistance was denied. All
hope was lost. The "machinery of government" was on the verge of collapsing, with the
courts having to "close down" and the government unable to "afford the £20 a month" to
keep the skeleton force of "thirteen men" garrisoned at Forts Montagu and Nassau.
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Forsaken by the King and abandoned by the mainland colonies, whose trade was the
lifeblood of the islands, the Bahamas faced economic devastation and a coming
revolution that would turn the colony on its head.

The Imperial Crisis raised serious problems with which the colony would have to
grapple in order to survive in a rapidly changing Atlantic World. Issues about taxation
raised internal discussion regarding the Bahamian colonial government's relationship to
Turks Island in a manner analogous to the ongoing Imperial dialogue over parliamentary
taxation in the American colonies. The economic crisis brought on by the evaporation of
commercial trade with the mainland, and the islands' inability to expand agricultural
lands and cultivate cash crops, exposed the dependent nature of the archipelago. The
boycotts designed to protest the taxation schemes of Parliament inhibited the free flow of
trade into the Bahamas, and threw the colony into bankruptcy. Earlier attempts to survive
by increasing trade revenues via establishing free ports and smuggling operations were all
for naught.
While economic hardship, illicit trading, and the dependency on commercial trade
with the mainland colonies for income and provisions defined the Bahamas' past, they
would also characterize much of its future during the American Revolution. Bahamians
soon found themselves caught between warring factions of American rebels, who sought
to obtain military supplies in exchange for desperately needed food while expanding their
influence into the colony, and British loyalists attempting to hold the line and root out
rebel sympathizers. Invasions and threats of invasions sent the fragile colony into chaos.
Political battles between the governor and local colonial officials brought the archipelago
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to the point of a gubernatorial dictatorship and a planned coup d'etat by the council.
During this chaotic time the islanders would find themselves facing a serious quandary:
should they engage in trade with the rebel Americans to provide food for themselves and
their families (and consequently be labeled traitors to the Crown), or remain loyal while
watching their loved ones starve to death from famine?
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CHAPTER II

CAUGHT BETWEEN REALITIES: THE REVOLUTION, THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, AND POLITICAL TURMOIL IN THE BAHAMA ISLANDS

On March 30 th , 1779, Governor Montfort Browne of the Bahama Islands took the
"unprecedented" step of disbanding his council. 1 Browne's action was designed to bring
an end to the political battle being waged, both in Nassau and London, against Lieutenant
Governor John Gambier's "opposition junta," which was endeavoring to remove him.
The battle had raged for more than a year. Browne constantly bombarded both Gambier's
junta and the inhabitants with accusations of "illicit trading" with the American rebels,
and of having secretly invited American forces ashore during the 1776 invasion of New
Providence Island. Browne's hostility towards the Bahamian people resulted in the Board
of Trade removing him, and appointing John Maxwell as governor. The political tempest
in this desolate, sandy archipelago speaks to more than just conflict between Montfort
Browne and the Bahamians; it illustrates significant effects the American Revolution and
the Continental Congress had on the peripheral colonies of the British Atlantic World.
The Bahama Islands were both geographically and economically isolated from
much of the empire, yet the Revolution's upheaval and the Continental Congress reached
even there. Consequently, the population consisted of a mere 1,992 whites and 2,201
"reputed blacks" in 1773 settled across New Providence, Harbour Island and Spanish

1 Craton.

A History of the Bahamas. 1 57.
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Wells, Exuma, Eleuthera, Cat Island, and Turks Island. The 4,193 inhabitants made the
Bahamas the smallest colony in British America, and the dearth of trade made it one of
the poorest. Their isolated nature left them with inadequate and crumbling defenses,
which made the Bahamas the only "loyal" colony to be successfully captured by the
Americans. In a mere six years, the Bahama Islands experienced a fundamental political
transformation. They went from a financially destitute colonial government, to a partisan
political circus that blamed opponents for allowing the colony to be surrendered to the
American rebels and possibly join the rebellion, and then to the "unprecedented"
dismissal of the Governor's Council and the formation of a military government. 2
The Bahamian political conflict and breakdown were not merely the result of an
internal conflict over differing opinions on how to govern the colony effectively during a
time of Imperial crisis; rather, it was the unintentional consequences of the Continental
Congress' foreign trade policy and military actions. Confronted with the necessity of
supplying the Continental Army with munitions to secure American Independence, and
the desire to maintain an open trade policy with the impoverished colonies of Bahama
and Bermuda to entice them to join the United States, the Congress attempted to do both.
This "middle-of-the-road solution," created out of necessity and benevolence, had dire
political consequences for Bahamians. These consequences, in turn, came back to haunt

" Burns. History of the British West Indies. 463, 465, 514; Jack P. Greene, Pursuits of Happiness: The
Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture (Chapel
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Characteristics and Sectional Tendencies in the Era Preceding the American Crisis (Caldwell, ID: The
Caxton Printers. Ltd., 1936), 284-285; Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream: A History of the
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Congress. The formation of the opposition junta and Governor Browne's minor
dictatorship eventually caused Congress to end the islands' trade privileges.
Britain's great Blue-Water Empire consisted of approximately thirty-three
colonies stretching from Tobago to Quebec and West Florida to Bermuda. Historical
discussion of political conflicts during the American Revolution has been monopolized
by three great conflicts: the thirteen colonies against the Crown and Parliament, Patriots
against Loyalists, and "Country" Whig philosophy against the corrupt "Court Party." 3
These three conflicts can be distilled into a single overarching category labeled "the
thirteen colonies versus Great Britain." As interconnections through the Atlantic World
appear more germane to explaining the "cause" and "effects" of the Revolution,
discussion of political conflicts during the Revolution can be expanded to includc internal
political conflicts in the colonies beyond the American mainland.
The effects of the Revolution on Britain's Blue-Water Empire largely have
focused on the negative impact it had on West Indian trade. As a result scholars have
devoted little attention to the Revolution's impact on the political scenes of the West
Indian colonies. 4 Andrew O'Shaughnessy's seminal work An Empire Divided has

'' Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The Fall of the British Empire: Origins of the War of
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explained how the Imperial Crisis and the Revolution affected the principal West Indian
sugar colonies politically; however, his focus centers on the reasons why the islands
broke with their northern brethren and shunned the "mainland revolt." 5 Historians
Michael Jarvis and Wilfred Kerr have touched upon the political skirmishes within
colonial Bermuda during the Revolution, which parallel a number of actions taken by the
Bahamians and Governor Browne, but ultimately lack the significant events that the
Bahamas experienced. 6 As Kerr shows, the Bermudan assembly voted on a number of
controversial bills, ranging from blocking funds for maintaining the island's forts to
promoting "free trade" with the rebellious Americans, all of which ended with little more
than a veto or an adjourned session. 7 Bermuda produced nothing comparable in severity
to the formation of John Gambier's "'Juncto' to oppose the Governor," and Browne's
"unprecedented" dismissal of his council. 8 Thus, the Bahamian political crisis offers
scholars a unique case study on how the Congress' external policies during the
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Revolution affected a remote colony, causing a hostile battle within the Bahamian
government.
At the local level various groups of historians have assembled different portions
of the Bahamian historical puzzle. Michael Craton and Gail Saunders have worked
tirelessly to construct the story of the Bahamian people from pre-Columbian times to the
present day, while Loyalist historians have established the transformative effects that the
Loyalist influx had on the post-war archipelago. 9 Consequently, the American Revolution
and its effects on the islands have been observed chiefly from a British and Bahamian
perspective. These standpoints have addressed the American involvement in terms of
"loyalties divided," and an "almost out of hand" situation stemming from the American
invasions of Nassau in 1776 and 1778 that severely hampered the colony's defensive
capabilities. 10 Military histories centering on the naval invasion of Nassau in 1776 have
left the Congress' trade policy and its ramifications unexamined."
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The Continental Congress' military policy towards the Bahama Islands began to
develop in the "munitions chess game" between rebellious colonists and British
authorities, which strove to secure strategic local and regional stores of gunpowder,
ammunition, and weapons from the enemy. The outcome would either neutralize the
rebel uprisings by removing the rebels' ability to conduct an armed resistance, or provide
military supplies to protect the protesting colonists until George III and his loyal
opposition "reverse[d] the course" of the North administration. 12 As military action in the
North American colonies dragged on, the need to acquire large stocks of gunpowder to
advance the cause became more evident. When George Washington took command of the
newly created Continental Army and the militia forces laying siege to Boston on June
15 th , 1775, the need for adequate gunpowder and ammunition overshadowed other
concerns. In his numerous communiques with Congress, Washington stressed that the
troops surrounding Boston were "very poorly supplied" and there was "a great want of
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Powder." 13 "We are so exceedingly destitute," he exclaimed, that "our Artillery will be of
little Use," and the little supplies available "must be reserved for the small Arms...[with
the] utmost Frugality." 14 The quantity of powder at hand amounted to "no more than 9
Rounds a Man," which would have had disastrous consequences on the battlefield. 15 As a
result, the Congress found itself in a serious predicament. Incapable of supplying the
Continental Army with the amount of powder necessary to successfully conduct a
sustained, long-term military conflict, it became apparent that Congress would have to
take drastic measures.
To satisfy the Army's need Congress sought additional powder through
importation, private manufacturers and backyard powder mills, and capture of enemy
supplies. Importation and capturing British munitions were central to Congress'
developing foreign policy. 16 Importation was the principle means of acquiring military
supplies for American forces, mainly from the French via the Dutch West Indian free
ports, but seizure of British stores quickly proved to have serious repercussions. 17

13

"George Washington to the Continental Congress, June 25, 1775," The Papers of George Washington:
Revolutionary War Series, Vol. 1: June - September 1775, ed. W. W. Abbot and Philander D. Chase
(Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1985), 32; "George Washington to John Hancock, June
25, 1775," PGW: RWS, Vol. 1, 35. The book The Papers of George Washington: Revolutionary War Series
is abbreviated as PGW: RWS after the first cited work, and for the rest of the thesis.
14 "George Washington to John Hancock, July 10-1 1, 1775," PGW: RWS. Vol. 7. 89. Prior to his arrival at
Cambridge he had requested that a "Return" be made of the inventory, which listed "303'/2 [barrels] of
Powder" in the store, but he discovered that there were only 36 barrels in the Massachusetts store.
Combined with Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Connecticut stores this totaled 9.937 lbs.,
approximately 99'A barrels amounting to a sixty-seven percent shortfall.

"George Washington to John Hancock, August 4, 1775," PGW: RWS, Vol. 1. 227.
16

Lucille E. Horgan, Forged in War, 1-27: Donald E. Reynolds. "Ammunition Supply in Revolutionary
Virginia," The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 73.no. 1 (January. 1965): 56-57. 59.
' ' J . F r a n k i n J a m e s o n . " S t . E u s t a t i u s i n t h e A m e r i c a n R e v o l u t i o n " i n The American Revolution in the West
Indies, ed. Charles W. Toth, 86-100: Horgan. Forged in War. 7-1 1: Rayford W. Logan. "Saint Domingue:

41

The quest for military supplies for the resistance against British tyranny and the
fate of the Bahama Islands converged on Wednesday, November 29 th , 1775. Congress
received word of approximately 200 barrels of gunpowder locked away in the poorly
maintained forts on New Providence Island. In all likelihood, the tip came from
Downham Newton, an enigmatic trader from New Providence who sought provisions for
his starving family and neighbors back home. On the same day the news of the arsenal
arrived, a petition by Newton was laid before Congress asking them to authorize a supply
of provisions to be sent to the islands in order to relieve the "distressed inhabitants." The
news was delegated to the Naval Committee with the instructions to "take measures for
securing and bringing away" the munitions and, if successful, to have the powder brought
to Philadelphia. 18
The instructions issued to Commodore Esek Hopkins by Congress would bring
the Continental Navy to the Bahamian shores, but not by a direct order. Directed to clear
the Chesapeake and the Carolina coast of British warships, Hopkins was issued "special
orders" by the Marine Committee and Congress. Though they contained no particular
mention about the gunpowder at New Providence, Congress did allow for alternative
actions to be taken provided that they were "most useful to the American cause" and
distressed "the enemy by all means in your power." However, Hopkins was not
empowered by the Congress to bring the Bahamas into the Union through military force.
Entrepot for Revolutionaries" in The American Revolution in the West Indies, ed. Charles W. Toth. 101111.
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Nevertheless, the clause enabled Hopkins to take the fleet to New Providence in an
attempt to obtain desperately needed munitions. 19
How Hopkins became aware of the gunpowder stores on New Providence is not
exactly certain, but two theories connect him with Congress' knowledge of the Bahamian
gunpowder. The first posits that Hopkins was in Philadelphia on November 29 th , which
would have made him aware of the New Providence arsenal at the same time as the
delegates. The second asserts that he learned about the stockpile through correspondence
with his brother Stephen Hopkins, part of the Rhode Island delegation and a sitting
member of the Naval Committee. Nonetheless, Hopkins apparently knew about the
gunpowder stores well in advance of receiving his official instructions in early January
1776. 20
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The rebelling Congress and the "loyal" Bahamas were on course for a dramatic
confrontation. By the mere inclusion of this discretionary clause in Hopkins instructions,
coupled with its gunpowder acquisition policies, Congress unwittingly put in motion a
military action that would have a profoundly polarizing effect on the backwater
Bahamas' political environment. In a short span of four years the canvas-colored "storm
clouds" of the Continental Navy that loomed on the blue horizon would give way to the
devastating hurricane of internal political dispute.

Weighing anchor at Cape Henlopen, Delaware on February 17 th , 1776,
Commodore Hopkins's small squadron of six armed "made-over" schooners broke
through the sea ice, which had delayed the journey from Philadelphia for nearly a month,
and set out into the Atlantic. Encountering cold, blustery winter winds and an epidemic of
small pox that swept through the fleet, Hopkins elected to sail south to the warm
Bahamian waters "even before reaching the Chesapeake." Sailing east into the Atlantic
allowed Hopkins to avoid any possible confrontation with the "well-disciplined,
experienced crew[s]" of Governor Dunmore's squadron, which would have trapped the
fleet in Chesapeake Bay and decimated them. Utilizing the "discretionary powers" in his
instructions, Hopkins charted a course for the unsettled shores of the Abaco Islands on
the northern fringe of the Bahamas archipelago to prepare for a major assault on New
Providence. The mission had

undergone a crucial change in objectives from

reconnaissance and minor naval skirmishes, to a major attack on a British colony in order
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to seize desperately needed "wartime stores" to resupply George Washington and the
Continental Army. 21
The Continental fleet reached the inhospitable, rocky shores of Hole-in-the-Wall,
Abaco, on March 1 st , proudly flying the standard of the "United Colonies" as they made
their way along the coastline. The conflict between the King and his cantankerous New
England subjects 1,250 miles away in Boston was no longer so distant; it had now arrived
in the far-removed cays of the Bahamas. Commodore Hopkins impressed of "two local
sailors" to guide his fleet through the treacherous, ever-shifting sand bars to New
Providence. Whatever element of surprise Hopkins and his captains thought they had was
99

lost even before their spyglasses displayed Abaco's shores.

A week before the fleet's arrival, "Captain Andrew Law," an "officer in His
Majesty's Land Service," strode into the run down port of Nassau with news that a "fleet
of eight small warships" was amassing off the snow-encrusted shores of Cape Delaware
with "the intention of attacking New Providence."

23

A second, more imperative alarm
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came on the day the Americans appeared off Abaco. This time Captain George Dorsett
came directly to Government House to deliver the news, having cut his whaling
expedition short because "he thought it his Duty to return to Port" to deliver the
"intelligence." 24 Informing Governor Browne that based on the "Manseuvers of
the...vessels" they were most certainly "bound [for] the Island of New Providence,"
Captain Dorsett was dismissed by the governor who informed him that "he would
Summon the Council" due to the "Undoubted Intelligence of the Enemy being so near
us." 25 Despite these serious warnings no precautionary actions were taken, and bedlam
broke out on March 3 rd when the small flotilla appeared during the early morning light.
The Revolution, and the imperial turmoil that accompanied it, had arrived at New
Providence's sandy doorstep.
Panic quickly ensued, at least for the governor and the colonial assemblymen, as
they tried to defend the island. Immediately informed of the Americans' arrival by a
"Pilot" who had spied the approaching fleet, Governor Browne was at a loss about what
he should do. Having arrived from his home in Britain to assume the colony's
governorship only two years earlier, Browne had not expected to find himself facing a

since his work contains neither footnotes nor endnotes, and only a barebones bibliography. Riley only cites
two secondary source works in the endnote pertaining to the paragraph mentioning "Captain Andrew
Shaw," being Gardner Weld Allen's A Naval History of the American Revolution and James H. Stark's
Stark's History and Guide to the Bahama Islands, neither of which mention a "Captain Andrew Shaw."
Because of these factors the name "Andrew Law" listed in the Colonial Office documents will be used
instead of the "Andrew Shaw" used in both Craton and Riley.
For citations relating to Riley's research and cited works, see: Riley, Homeward Bound, 100, 242nl5;
Allen. A Naval History of the American Revolution, 95-97; James H. Stark, Stark's History and Guide to
the Bahama Islands (Boston: Photo-Electrotype Company, 1891), 71.
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(Summer. 1980): 308-309.
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hostile invasion by the American colonists. Standing at the window of Government
House in his nightshirt, Browne bluntly asked the man: "what was to be done?" Due to
Government House's commanding view of the harbor below, Browne could most likely
see the topmasts and sails of the American ships approaching beyond Hog Island from his
own window. As fear set in, the governor ordered the militia to be summoned with three
shots from a signal cannon. The proper militia summons was only two shots. Councilman
Samuel Gambier, who was "so lame with the gout that he could not walk," rushed as
quickly as possible to Fort Montague only to find that two hours into the siege nothing
had been done. Browne and the Council were seriously considering removing the
gunpowder stores from the island; however, it was pointedly argued by the Council that
removing the powder would only handicap the island's virtually non-existent ability to
repel an enemy attack. 26
In their greatest hour of need the colony's defenses were quickly discovered to be
virtually useless. Fort Nassau's cannons were readied and fired at the enemy fleet, which
deterred the Americans from committing a frontal assault on Nassau. However, the force
of the cannons' recoil was too much for their wooden carriages, which had become rotten
in the humid tropical climate, and were immediately torn off and rendered useless "on
there [sic] first firing." While the weather had taken its toll on the carriages, the island
itself was consuming many of Fort Nassau's additional cannons. The consistently drifting
sands had submerged the cannons' "axle trees" to the point that "12 or 15 men" were
required just to move them into position. The sea had taken its toll on the Fort as well,
having "washed away" and "weakened" one of the buttresses to the point where "five or

C.O. 23/9/112-113: A Plan and View of the Harbour and Town of Providence on board His Majesty's
ship Escorte by Capt. Foley. MPG 1/1066/7.
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six" cannon percussions would have "inevitably brought it down." While Fort Nassau's
condition was abominable; Fort Montagu's was worse. At Fort Montagu there was
neither a "Barrel of Powder, nor a length of Match" that was useable, and its guns were
not "properly mounted" thus preventing them for being used to ward off the American
invasion. The militia summoned to defend the island was in no shape to fight the
invading American Marines. With only a defensive force of ninety men answering the
call the militia was outnumbered approximately three to one, and of those who did report
"several...had arms unfit for service" while others "were without

Flints and

Ammunition." Faced with these realities, repelling the American force appeared to be an
impossible task.

27

Browne made a number of key miscalculations that would fuel the fires of his
Bahamian political enemies several years later. The first was his decision to leave Fort
Nassau stating that he was going to "go home" in order to "make himself a little decent,"
an action that took him approximately "three hours," and left no one in charge of the fort
"to take Command or give the necessary Orders." Thus, it fell upon the council members
to take command, and they quickly surmised that Browne would not return to "defend
His Majesty's Forts" and "repel the Enemy." Browne's second decision was to withdraw
the militia from Fort Montague to Fort Nassau, spiking the Fort's cannons to ensure they
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could not be used by the Americans, without engaging the Marines who had made
landfall nearby. The governor almost committed a third ill-advised decision when he
pushed the council to allow him to have Fort Nassau's guns spiked after the powder
stores were secretly ferried away to several awaiting ships bound for St. Augustine.
However, the council overruled him fearing that this would only goad the Americans into
setting fire to the town after they discovered the powder missing. Nevertheless Governor
Browne surrendered the island, and in a fortnight the American invaders loaded their
ships with the Forts' munitions and set sail for Rhode Island with Montfort Browne as
their prisoner.

28

The actions taken during the American invasion and occupation of New
Providence formed the basis for several key arguments and accusations used during the
political war between Montfort Browne and the inhabitants. Browne's abandonment of
Fort Montagu to the Americans, his failure to engage the enemy in defense of Nassau, the
loss of the colony's gunpowder and much of their stockpiled munitions, and his own
capture were seen by Bahamian leaders as representative of incompetent leadership.
However, the actions of the citizenry and principle inhabitants during the occupation
provided Browne with a grave retort: the inhabitants willfully fraternized with the enemy.
While Browne's retort may very well be true, outside of Browne's assertion there does

A Narrative of the Transactions & on the Invasion of the Island of New Providence by the Rebels in
1776, June 15'\ 1779, C.O. 23/9/113-114: Fort Nassau during March 3 rd , 1776. C.O. 23/9/126-129; Esek
Hopkins, "Inventory of Stores &c. taken at Fort Nassau-March 3, 1776" in The Correspondence of Esek
Hopkins, ed. Alverda S. Beck (Providence. RI: Roger Williams Press, 1933). 35.
A full list of the munitions and equipment taken from Fort Nassau includes the following: "71 Cannon from
9 to 32 Pounders;" 15 Mortars from 4 to 11 inches in diameter; 5,337 shells; 9,831 "round shott [sic];" 140
hand grenades; 816 "Fuzees [sic] or false Fires;" 99 Sponge-staves, Rammers, and Worms: 24 casks of
gunpowder: and, a "Quantity of Match Rope not Weigh'd [sic]." An additional list of munitions taken from
Fort Montagu consists of: 17 cannon from 9 to 36 Pounders: 1.240 "round shott [sic]:" and. 121 shells. See:
Esek Hopkins. "Inventory of Stores &c. taken at Fort Nassau-March 3. 1776" in The Correspondence of
Esek Hopkins. 35; Field, Esek Hopkins, 115-116n2.
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not appear to be any evidence demonstrating that the Bahamians explicitly engaged in a
possible conspiracy to join the Union-mainly due to the lack of any supporting accounts
from the inhabitants. 29 This claim would be a common element of Browne's various
letters to Lords Dartmouth and Germain during the transatlantic letter war he waged
against the opposition junta. The fraternization between the occupying Americans and the
inhabitants resulted in, as Michael Craton asserts, "over 200" of the Americans becoming
"seriously ill on the voyage home" because of the amount of "captured...wine" they
"caroused on." These malicious charges ultimately had their roots in the policies and
objectives of the Continental Congress, which, in combination with Congress' trade
policy, would send the political world of the hardscrabble colony into chaos. 30

On the same day as the Congress learned about the cache of gunpowder in the
Bahamas, they began to formulate a commercial trade policy towards the islands. Before
the chamber a petition was presented by Downham Newton requesting permission to
export "1,000 barrels of flour" to alleviate the "distressed inhabitants" of New
Providence. In exchange, Newton offered the Congress "such a quantity of muskets as
can be procured" from the sale of the cargo. This was a bold offer; most likely driven by
a desire to aid his starving family and neighbors, Newton shunted aside his patriotism for
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King and country and offered weapons in exchange for victuals for his fellow Bahamians.
Congress accepted Newton's petition based on the recommendations of Thomas
Jefferson, Andrew Allen, and John Jay, and subsequently granted him permission to
export "such provisions of flour and pork" as he thought proper. The decision to permit
Downham Newton to conduct trade with the distressed Bahamians would prove to be the
first step in creating a benevolent trade policy towards the colony, and possibly making it
the fourteenth state in order to limit contentious borderlands between the emerging
United States and Great Britain. 31
This reveals an important distinction about the nature of the Congress' external
policy actions. The trade policy created a peaceful form of interaction between Congress
and the Bahamians, one that contrasted sharply with the hostile invasion of New
Providence. However, the policy was not one that could be characterized as altruistic.
Congress had its own motives for allowing Bermuda and the Bahama Islands to be
exempt from the embargo against the British Empire. As Lucille Horgan points out in
Forged in War, the issuance of "embargo waivers" to specific colonies or to individuals
(such as Downham Newton) permitted the United States to obtain arms easily through
direct trade, and without risking their forces in aggressive military actions. The policy
also attempted to use trade and provisions to win support from the Bahamians for the
American cause, possibly leading the colony to join the rebellion against the British
government. 32

'' Continental Congress. September 21, 1775 - December 31. 1775, vol. 3 of JCC. 369, 389-390.
Horgan, Forged in War, 9-11.
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The benevolent trade policy towards the Bahamians continued to form in the
weeks and months following Commodore Hopkins successful assault on New
Providence, particularly with respect to extending a kind hand to those who were
adversely affected by the American invasion. An application for economic restitution
from Congress was made by Charles Walker of New Providence, because his sloop
Endeavor had been commandeered by Hopkins for the "use of the colonies," along with
its four ton cargo of "lignum vitae" and "one hundred cedar posts." 33 For an inhabitant of
the most isolated and decentralized colony in the British Atlantic World the loss of one's
ship was devastating. In this far-flung world, one's livelihood and survival depended on
ships to gather food, collect raw materials (e.g. salt and timber) from neighboring islands,
and bring those raw materials to markets throughout the Atlantic World. 34 In order to
repay Walker for the trouble he had been caused, Congress ordered the ship to be
"restored" to him along with "all her stores and materials," and that he be paid a "sum of
two thousand dollars" to defray "all losses, damages, premiums of insurance, and
expences [sic]" he might have incurred.

-3 c

However, if there was any money remaining,

Walker was specifically encouraged to "invest the balance...in produce" to be exported
and sold-most likely to Bahamas. 36

33 Continental Congress, June 5, 1776 - October 8, 1776, vol. 5 of .ICC, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford
(New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation. 1968). 424-425.
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(September, 2007): 245-281.
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The petitions brought before Congress by Henry Tucker's Bermudian delegation
may have also helped in shaping its trade policy towards the impoverished Bahamas. The
Bermudians and the Bahamians suffered terribly economically during the years prior to
the start of the American Revolution. Bermuda in particular had been adversely affected
by the Congress' trade embargo, which had been implemented incrementally against the
entire British Empire between December 1 st , 1774 and September 1 st , 1775. 37 The non
importation and non-exportation agreements, which made up the key components of the
embargo, effectively cut-off Bermuda and the Bahamas from their major sources of food
and revenue. This threatened both colonies with famine and caused petitions to be
submitted to Congress requesting relief from the "distress.. .[to] which they were exposed
by the non-exportation agreement." 38 In the case of Bermuda, Congress perceived that
the islanders were "friendly to the cause of America," and because of this the inhabitants
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"ought to be supplied" with "so great a quantity...[of the] produce" of the assembled
colonies. 39 Although the delegates requested an "annual allowance of salt" to be paid in
exchange, the Bermudians were permitted to trade war materials for "produce to any
amount." 40 While the Bahamians did not receive any equivalent sustenance allowance
from Congress, the Downham Newton case seems to provide a strong indication that
acquiring munitions from patriots, or other American-sympathizers, outside the mainland
colonies was a serious motive behind their actions. In essence what was emerging was a
type of gunpowder-for-food program, but when Congress finally addressed its trade
policy with Bermuda and the Bahamas in the summer of 1776, it was rather uncertain.
A fairly ambiguous trade policy emerged in July 1776. This policy came in the
form of an "addendum exemption" to the full trade embargo Congress implemented on
September 1 st , 1775. The addendum exemption sought to remedy the food shortages in
Bermuda and the Bahamas caused by the non-importation and non-exportation
agreements put in place almost eleven months earlier. The addendum exemption opened
up much needed commercial trade to bring food and revenue to the islands, and assuaged
the "distressed inhabitants." Yet, there were no hard-line rules regarding what goods
could or could not be exchanged; rather, the exemption merely placed a prohibition on
the seizure of vessels and goods belonging to the Bermudians and Bahamians by
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American patriots. Bahamian vessels were now permitted to dock in patriot-held ports
and offload their goods. This allowed merchants, captains, and principal members of the
islands to send their ships to American ports, and return with illicit trade goods-an action
prohibited by the British government. 41
The policy attempted to expand the boundaries and influence of the United States
into Bermuda and the Bahamas through open trade, instead of treating them as separate
foreign territories. Unlike the idealistic and theoretical Model Treaty and the Treaty of
Amity and Commerce with France, which contained specific trading principles and
regulations on goods, the addendum exemption's lack of these items allowed for the new
United States to commercially interact with Bermuda and the Bahamas as if they were
part of a single entity. At its core the exemption was an attempt to draw the Bahamas and
Bermuda into a closer relationship with the United States, and expand its authority into
the neighboring peripheral colonies. 42
American political figures worked to incorporate neighboring colonies into the
United States through various negotiations with the British military and France. On two
occasions during the war, Benjamin Franklin asserted the United States' claim to the
Bahamas, as well as the Canadian colonies and Bermuda, as part of their territory. The
first instance occurred in late September 1776, when Franklin proposed a sketch for
peace to Lord William Howe, which requested that Britain cede control of "Quebec, St.
John's, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, East and West Florida, and the Bahama islands" to the
United States. By doing this a strict boundary line would be created between the United
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States and the British Empire, which was devoid of grey frontier zones that enables
"occasions of misunderstanding" to arise over the "bad conduct of frontier inhabitants."
Almost six months later during a diplomatic mission to France, Franklin expressly stated
to the French Foreign Minister Comte de Vergennes that a joint French and American
force should be utilized to conquer all of Britain's American colonies, and if successful
the non-sugar producing colonies be put under the jurisdiction of the United States. As a
result this would have made the Bahamas a part of an expanded United States, along with
the Canadian provinces, Bermuda, and the Floridas. 43
In this theoretical "new" world, the North American mainland, Bermuda, and the
Bahama Islands would be the dominion of the United States, and the former British West
Indian colonies would become part of a resurrected New France. The rationale behind
why all the principal sugar colonies of the British West Indies were allocated to France,
and Bermuda and the Bahamas were to be a part of the United States, was twofold. The
first reason would be to provide significant financial motive for France to join the war on
the side of the Americans. The second reason stems from the diminished support for the
American cause in the sugar colonies by 1776, as argued by Andrew O'Shaughnessy,
while support continued in Bermuda and the Bahamas well after July 1776. Michael
Jarvis and Michael Craton both note that these islanders engaged in supporting the
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American cause through trade or covert seizures of military supplies, as well as leaving
the British controlled colonies to join the American cause on the mainland. 44
Whatever the Congress' conception of how the Bahamas existed in relation to the
newly established United States, the islands were directly affected by their trade policy
decisions. The implementation of an embargo in 1775 against the whole British Empire
consequently cut-off the meager trade that managed to sail into the archipelago. The
embargo barred Bahamian ships from entering mainland ports to sell lumber, turtle meat,
fruit, and salt in exchange for desperately needed provisions, thus causing a famine.
Petitions were submitted requesting relief for the "distressed inhabitants." Congress'
establishment of a benevolent trade policy through the addendum exemption, whether as
a means of acquiring munitions for the war or enticing the colony to join the Union,
brought the colony away from abyss of starvation created by the non-importation and
non-exportation agreements. Yet, this policy would become an important factor in the
political conflict between Governor Browne, the Council, and the islands' inhabitants.

The effects of Congress' ambivalent foreign policy towards the Bahamas set the
stage for a political confrontation between the British-born Governor Browne, the
Council and General Assembly, and the local islanders. The dispute would go beyond the
traditional incessant bickering between governors and assemblies over the role of the
"royal prerogative," and become an all out political war for control of the Bahamas. 45 It
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erupted shortly after Governor Browne's return to New Providence in December 1778,
after he was traded for the rebel pretender Lord Sterling, and taking the reins from
Assembly President John Brown-who served as the interim governor during Browne's
absence. The internal conflict materialized from the rapid convergence of two principle
issues: (1) negative characterizations of Browne's actions during the 1776 American
invasion, and (2) the illicit trading between the inhabitants and the rebellious Americans.
The opening salvo came on January 4 th , 1779. In a scathing public declaration,
Browne bitterly let loose two years of muzzled opinions and emotions. The "Conduct and
Behavior" of the populace "Countenance[d] and Incourage[d] [sic]" the rebel invaders,
and "manifested] their designs in favor of the Rebels" while demonstrating an
"uncommon degree of Indolence to me." The restored governor was clearly not holding
back. He accused "Sundry Inhabitants" of disregarding "their Allegiance...to their
Lawful Sovereign," and willfully ignored a royal proclamation and "positive Act of
Parliament" by trading with the rebellious Americans "instigated" by their "View of
Gain." 46
Adding insult to injury Browne offered the Bahamians a "gracious" opportunity
to escape from their situation. However, doing so would require the inhabitants to come
forward and personally taken an "Oath of Allegiance" in front of Browne and the
Council. This, in combination with the accusations, was deeply insulting to the
inhabitants. Accepting the governor's offer would be nothing less than a tacit admission
of guilt, and a confirmation that Browne's charges were in fact true, regardless of the fact
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that there was no appearance of an open debate on joining the American rebellion by the
Bahamian government. 47
In Browne's mind the actions of the inhabitants were tied directly with the
American rebels. Browne argued that the Americans had been invited to New Providence
by the colonists for "the purpose on which they came," and that a great "Quantity of
48

Flower [sic] was sent by Congress" to entice the Bahamians into aiding them.

This was

also the opinion held by Lord George Germain, who agreed with Browne's assessment
that a secret alliance had been made between the rebels and the inhabitants, and that the
Bahamas was moving towards joining with the breakaway American colonies. 49 The
actions of the people and the council members during the raid were also subject to the
governor's pell mell accusations. 50 Browne asserted that Commodore Hopkins and his
officers were "countenanced" by the Council and other prominent members of the
community, and "elegantly entertained" at the residences of "some of the Officers of
[the] Government." 51 These were scandalous charges, which fell between libel and
treason. Browne's claims would end the careers (and lives) of the council members if the
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Board of Trade and the Admiralty decided to take action. The Bahamians and the Council
had to act before the Browne's accusations gained any more traction.
The inhabitants and the Council were not going to take Montfort Browne's
accusations without issuing a response. In a lengthy letter to the Board of Trade, the
Council outlined the "very gross Misrepresentations" made against their conduct and the
"Inhabitants in general." The Council conjectured that the "grand Aim" of the oath was to
shift the "Attention of His Majesty's Ministers from [Browne] to the Inhabitants," in a
desperate effort to deflect attention away from his actions during the rebel assault. In
attempting to divert attention onto the inhabitants the Council concluded that Browne was
trying to prevent the Board of Trade from conducting a formal inquiry into the incident.
This formal inquiry would have brought to light the governor's "incompetent" decisions
during the American attack, and easily show "whom the Disgrace of that unfortunate
Day" should fall upon. 52
The General Assembly, in conjunction with the Council, drew attention to
Governor Browne's blunders in their own letters and petitions delivered directly to him.
In a "Remonstrance" delivered on March 12 th , the assembly and council made a direct
challenge to Browne regarding the events on the "unhappy day" of Hopkins' assault. The
remonstrance asserted that the inhabitants had done their "duty," and followed the
governor with "a determined Spirit" to engage the enemy. The council and assembly
accused Browne of not thinking it "proper to...[lead] them on the attack;" rather, he
"retreated" and "abandoned Fort Montague," and forced the men to leave their "Houses,
Property and Families to the ravage of the Enemy." Their point was clear, Browne had no
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one to blame but himself. The loss of Forts Montagu and Nassau, their munitions, and his
own capture rested on his inept shoulders. 53
The ripples of the Congress' desire to acquire munitions for the war effort and
their discretionary clause in Commodore Hopkins instructions had become major
political waves three years later. The events of the American invasion and occupation of
Nassau had become a political weapon for control of the colony and the opinion of the
Board of Trade across the Atlantic. The failures of Governor Browne in the heat of battle,
regardless of the conditions of the colony's defenses and the wisdom of engaging a
superior American force, had become a defensive argument of the council and
inhabitants. This argument was designed to counter Browne's accusations by focusing on
his ineptitude and poor decisions that caused the colony to fall in March 1776, and to lay
the groundwork for his dismissal.
While both sides of the political conflict utilized the American invasion as an
argument against the other, the ongoing trade between the islanders and the rebels
became a more serious issue. The Continental Congress' benevolent trade policy enabled
Bahamian ships to trade with the mainland unmolested by American naval and privateer
vessels as if they were members of the Union, while authorizing American vessels to
carry supplies to and from the islands. 54 The open trade enabled Bahamian fruit and salt
to be sold in cities along the coast from Salem, Massachusetts down to Savannah,
Georgia. 55 Congress' open trade prevented the islands from becoming economically

53 The Remonstrance of His Majesty's Council and the General Assembly, March 12, 1779, C.O.
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isolated, and partially alleviated the threat of widespread famine-while attempting to
persuade the Bahamians to join with the Americans by strengthening relations through
open trade. Nevertheless, the trade benefits provided by the policy via the addendum
exemption were accompanied by serious wartime socio-political issues. 56
The overarching issue faced by Bahamians, as well as other colonists living in
peripheral colonies, pitted loyalty against survival. Should a man remain loyal to his King
and ancestral mother-country, or should he engage in trade with his rebellious brethren in
order to feed himself and his family? The Continental Congress' benevolent trade policy
put the islanders in the very difficult position of having to answer this question. Trade
allowed victuals and other goods to flow into the remote colony, while providing an
avenue for inhabitants to sell raw materials to generate income that could help put food
on the tables of starving families. On Harbour Island, the "best bread" available '"even
for the blessed Sacrament' was 'made of Tree Roots,'" where the inhabitants were just
above "starving condition^]."
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However, by engaging in commercial trade with the

rebellious Americans the inhabitants committed a serious violation of Britain's wartime
policy, which could possibly bring charges of aiding the enemy and treason against
them. 38 For the old "conchs" that had long inhabited the Bahamas, experience from the

" "Just Imported and to be Sold by Geo. Crowninshield," New England Chronicle, May 18, 1775, 3;
"Extract of a Letter from Captain Alexander M'Pherson." New York Gazette, February 1, 1779, 3: NewJersey Gazette, December 10. 1777, 3.
~ h Riley, Homeward Bound, 96-99.
57

Ibid.. 98.

>!s

Letter from Governor Browne to Lord George Germain. May 10. 1777, C.O. 23/23/126r; Neil R. Stout,
The Royal Navy in America, 1760-1775: A Study of Enforcement of British Colonial Policy in the Era of
the American Revolution (Annapolis. MD: Naval Institute Press. 1973). 13-24. 165-170; McClellan,
Smuggling in the American Colonies at the Outbreak of the Revolution-. George Louis Beer. British
Colonial Policy, 1754-1765 (Gloucester. MA: Peter Smith, 1958), 72-85, 86-113, 114-131, 228-251; Jerry

62

Seven Years' War answered the Bahamians' conundrum: continue trading while
professing loyalty to the Crown. This solution presented the inhabitants with the ability to
maintain the veneer of being loyal British subjects, while simultaneously engaging in a
necessary and "profitable contraband trade" that brought provisions and trade goods to
the islands. 59
The absence of a royal official in the colony allowed the Bahamian-American
trade to occur. Prior to Browne's return the colony was managed by Lieutenant Governor
John Gambier, a native colonist of New Providence, who granted the Nassauvian
merchants various licenses to "carry on an open and free Intercourse" with the rebels. 60
The trade allowed the islanders to easily procure provisions to sustain themselves and
their families, while exporting desired salt and timber collected from the wilderness of
the Out Islands. "Gentlemen speculators" set up operations with New Providence planters
in an attempt to cultivate indigo, in order to trade back to the mainland. The possible
cultivation of Bahamian indigo for export received the attention of Congress, when
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Edward Kennedy, an "inhabitant of [New] Providence," brought "samples of green
indigo" that were "a new manufacture" he had discovered and was hoping to sell. 61
The illegal free intercourse carried on between the Bahamians and the rebel
American merchants brazenly continued right in front of Governor Browne's face. Upon
his return Browne found not just an illicit trade being conducted by the inhabitants of the
colony, but also blatant authorization and support for continuing the trade in the upper
echelon of the government. "1 find to my great mortification," exclaimed an exasperated
Browne in a letter to Lord Germain, that the illicit commerce was being "carried on [in]
so glaring a manner" that the lieutenant governor "has repeatedly applyed [sic] to
me...[to] continue a License," which permitted the local merchants to "carry on an open
and free Intercourse with the Rebels." John Hunt, the colony's "Collector," was
apparently no better than the lieutenant governor. In a second letter to Lord Germain, a
determined Browne stated that he had "peremptorily refused" to "grant [the] Letters of
Marque and Reprisals," which Hunt had applied for in order to allow "five ships of his
now loading.. .in Carolina" to be protected at another occasion. 62
The inhabitants of Turks Island were particularly daring with their illicit trade
practices. Upon returning to the island in 1778, agent Andrew Symmer found that the
settlers had entered into a "secret Agreement" with the French governor of St.
Dominigue, a blatant act of treason. The agreement with Britain's longstanding foe,
coupled with the "most open Rebellious manner" the settlers expressed towards Symmer,
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caused what few loyal inhabitants residing there to leave the island "to the mercy of the
lawless Banditti." 63
The situation needed to be brought under control, and the inhabitants' loyalty to
the British government restored. One method of accomplishing this was through the use
of "oaths of allegiance" to the Crown and laws of Parliament. This would theoretically
establish who was a loyal subject of Britain, and who was a treasonous rebel. On the
mainland British military officers and royal officials issued these oaths in exchange for
pardons-or not being taken as enemy prisoners. 64 Montfort Browne was certainly no
different. The governor's proclamation offered one such oath in the hope that this would
remedy some of the problems, while causing the inhabitants to admit their guilty activity
during the invasion. 65 However, like many of their mainland brethren, the inhabitants
could always lie and continue trading with the Americans for badly needed provisions. In
order to put additional breaks on the Bahamians' illegal free intercourse with the rebels,
Browne refused to grant any of the requested "Letters of Marque and Reprisals" or
licenses, intending to "put a check to this illicit Trade." 66 Yet, these measures were not
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entirely successful, and a number of heavily laden merchant vessels continued to land
their cargos on New Providence. 67
If the colony still could not be brought into line, a worst-case-scenario solution
would have to be implemented. Proposed by Lord Germain, this required the use of a
small military force to secure New Providence for Browne and reassert the rule of laweffectively stamping

out

the

rebellious

behavior

through

a

demonstration

of

overwhelming force. The political figures occupying seats in the colonial government
would be the main focus for Browne. By focusing on the actions of colonial officials with
respect to illicit trading and the American invasion of Nassau, Browne could ascertain
exactly who had been covertly aiding the rebels. Once identified, the individuals in
question were to be brought before the Crown to be dismissed from His Majesty's
service, in addition to possibly being arrested and put on trial for treason. 68
Further attempts to bring the colony under control began to take a dangerous and
"unprecedented" turn. In an attempt to solidify his hold on the colony from the opposition
junta, Browne began to systematically dismiss council members from their positions and
install outsiders who were closely connected with him and not native to the colony. The
reasons behind each dismissal varied. The discharge of Samuel Gambier from his duties
as "Judge of the Court of Vice Admiralty, and Receiver General" was made, according to
Browne, with "no fault to find" in the execution of Gambier's duties. In contrast, the
removal of Council President John Brown's son from the "Office of Secretary" was a
blatant act of retribution against President Brown. Montfort Browne's rationale for Mr.
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Brown's removal was because "of the glaring Behaviour of his Father," who had been the
acting "Commander in Chief' when the colony was surrendered to the Americans for a
second time in January 1778. Browne also attempted to covertly replace highly regarded
Chief Justice Thomas Atwood by granting him a leave of absence, and then two days
later declaring the Chief Justice's seat to be "vacant." With the seat newly "vacant,"
Browne attempted to fill it with his own personal friend Robert Cummings in order to put
him on the council, but the other members would not permit it. The governor also
appointed "two Assistant Judges" to the court dealing with offenses committed at sea,
which was made without the consent of the other justices and well outside the powers
granted by his official royal commission. These actions were a dangerous "Usurpation of
Powers," and only deepened the political chasm between Browne and the opposing junta
in the council. 69
The political climate in the colony deteriorated rapidly. The "Usurpation of
Powers" committed by Governor Browne in his effort to disrupt the "infernal Schemes"
of the "disaffected Juncto [sic]," culminated in his suspension of three council members
and the "Dissolution of the General Assembly." 70 Allowing the General Assembly to
continue to sit was rejected by Browne as being "in no wise [sic] for the Service of His
Majesty." 71 Yet, his true motive for dissolving them probably came from their assault on
his actions during the American invasion, which they had mentioned in the remonstrance
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delivered three days before his decision. 72 The dismissal of John and Samuel Gambier,
along with Robert Hunt, from the council was a part of an attempt to bring the colony's
illicit trading under greater control. This resulted from their continued "Extensive and
Lucrative Trade with the Rebels," which was enabled by the Continental Congress' trade
policy towards the islands.

7-5

The removal of the three councilmen was also a shrewd

maneuver to prevent John Gambier and the opposition junta from executing a coup
against the governor. Veiled threats of a coup emerged after the junta discovered that
Browne's original commission had disappeared during the 1776 invasion. If successful,
the plot would have installed John Gambier as the acting governor until a replacement
was appointed by Whitehall. 74
Montfort Browne's actions against the council, General Assembly, and the
inhabitants illustrate his desire to prevent the colony from joining with the Continental
Congress in rebellion against Britain. Browne's previous experience with the American
invasion in 1776, coupled with the continuous flow of illicit trade goods into the islands
from the rebellious mainland, caused Browne to see an underlying conspiracy. The
inhabitants engaged in trade with the Americans primarily out of a need for economic and
physical survival. The Bahamians were not attempting to become a potential fourteenth
state; rather, the benevolent trade policy opened an avenue that the inhabitants could use
to achieve the end goal of personal survival. Nevertheless, Browne certainly thought a
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Bahamian-American conspiracy existed. Because of the Bahamas' decentralized nature
and the lack of a strong military presence on the islands Browne was forced to try to exert
strength from a position of weakness, which resulted in his various actions that caused
the colony to spiral out of control politically.
The political brawl and dismissal of the assembly during a time of imperial war
put the colony in serious jeopardy. The governor refused to renew the Militia Act and
supporting Revenue Acts until the assembly "properly investigated" the "very
extraordinary Charges" that were "so false, so malignant, and so maliciously]" made
against him. Without a renewed Militia Act there was no authority to form militia
companies, and to ensure that they were "properly disciplined" in order to defend the
colony. The dissolution of the assembly and expiration of the Revenue Acts prevented
new revenue from coming into the colony's coffers. The resulting lack of funds barred
much needed renovations to the dilapidated forts from occurring, in addition to
replenishing the stocks of munitions lost during the American invasions. With "good
Intelligence" that there was an impending "Invasion by the French," the inhabitants
implored Browne to call a new assembly and renew the several Acts, because they were
"incapable of exerting their natural strength" to oppose an invading enemy force. The
multiple invasions by the Americans had taught them that much. 75
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While the threat of a French invasion worried the Bahamians at home, across the
Atlantic in London officials saw the troubling political breakdown and the rise of
Governor Browne's dictatorship as a severe problem. In London, the Board of Trade saw
the political conflict as putting the colony in "an absolute State of Anarchy," and in need
of laws for "the Revenue, the Militia, and other purposes" that were "essential" for its
welfare. The numerous complaints filed against Browne by the council members and the
assembly led the board to one conclusion: Montfort Browne had to be replaced. 76

John Maxwell arrived at New Providence in March 1781 to replace Governor
Browne. This brought an end to the bitter, divisive political struggle that had gripped the
hardscrabble, far-flung colony for over a year. The Continental Congress' concerns over
acquiring munitions had a dramatic, albeit unintended, effect on the Bahama Islands
political environment. American plans to entice the Bahamas into joining with the Union
as a potential "fourteenth state" were met with disappointment. The invasion caused both
sides to make numerous attacks on the other's character, and blame their opposition for
the downfall of the colony. The Bahamian-American trade brought desperately needed
supplies to the islanders, but made them appear as part of the rebel uprising. In order to
prevent the colony from joining the Continental Congress in the Revolution, Browne took
action to bring the inhabitants back firmly under British colonial authority-however, it
was at the cost of his position as governor. Ultimately the effect of Congress' policies
would result in the dissolution of the General Assembly, the suspension of three
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prominent members of the Governor's Council, a plotted coup, a short-lived dictatorship,
and the replacement of the governor-a broad and unique array of chaotic political events.
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CHAPTER III

THE LOYALIST REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POSTREVOLUTIONARY BAHAMAS

As the tide of the American Revolution turned against the British, colonists who
remained loyal to the Crown began to flee patriot held territories. Loyalists branched out
across the British Atlantic World. The overwhelming majority of Loyalist refugees
escaped to the Canadian colonies, the "middle ground" of the Great Lakes basin,
Bermuda and the Bahamas, the West Indies, and the British Isles. This began to solidify
the soft boundaries between the newly formed United States and the British Empire. 1
Yet, much of the mainland territory remained nebulous in terms of both enforcement and
loyalty until the "Civil War of 1812," when the Great Lakes frontier was ravaged by
devastating skirmishes that pitted neighbors against each other.
The influx of loyal refugees had a profound impact on the social characteristics of
these regions. Hardened Loyalists turned small settlements into bulwarks against the
growing influence of the emerging United States, while borderland regions became
dormant areas of contention that erupted into violent neighbor-against-neighbor conflict
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during the second War of Independence. However, while the borderland territories on the
American mainland remained ambiguous until the War of 1812, interspersed with
American settlers and British colonists, the island colonies underwent quick, sharp social
and economic alterations. Unlike the blurred identities of the North American mainland,
the Bahama Islands did not suffer from divided loyalties. Rather the Loyalist influx
overwhelmed and transformed the traditional dispositions of the islanders, which quickly
turned the archipelago into a Loyalist stronghold at the end of the American Revolution
and transformed the colony's economic, social, cultural, and racial characteristics in the
decades afterwards. 3
Traditional "old conchs" who had scratched out a living on the islands were
overwhelmed by the incoming Loyalists and their slaves, who were accustomed to the
plantation style agriculture of the Lower South. Scholarly estimates place the number of
"Old White Household Heads" in 1788 at 430, and the new Loyalist household heads at
330. New settler families superseded original families on seven different island groups:
New Providence, Exuma, Cat Island, Andros, Crooked and Acklin's Islands, and Caicos
Island. The relocated Loyalists brought with them over 3,762 slaves, which were nearly
double the existing slave population of 1,974 slaves. This transformed the socio-cultural,
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economic, and political nature of the Bahamas, bringing a die-hard imperial allegiance
that had been refined by the fires of civil war on the mainland. 4
The Loyalist exodus from the southern colonies during the second half of the
American Revolution quickly ended the Bahamians' practice of charting their own course
to ensure survival. While inhabitants had survived the French and Indian War and much
of the American Revolution by conducting illicit trade with Britain's enemies in order to
survive, Loyalist emigrants did not take kindly to the hypocritical actions of the
Bahamians. In May 1782, the Bahama Islands were surrendered by Governor Maxwell to
the Spanish when confronted with an overwhelming joint Spanish and American force of
fifty-nine armed vessels and approximately 2,000 soldiers. What resulted was the
subjugation of the loyal Bahamians and Loyalists settlers to "the insults and
Calamities...[of] Despotic" Spain for over a year. 5 For the Loyalist refugees fleeing to
the Bahamas, professing loyalty to King and country while continuing to trade with His
Majesty's enemies and surrendering the colony to the Spanish during the closing years of
the Revolution was intolerable.
The Loyalist transformation of the Bahama Islands has been the subject of
numerous historical works. 6 Gail Saunders and Sandra Riley have contributed

4 Craton

and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream: A History of the Bahamian People, Volume One, 180.

^ Craton, A History of the Bahamas, 158.
6

Riley, Homeward Bound: Craton. A History of the Bahamas, 162-186: Jasanoff, Liberty's Exiles; Peters,
"The Loyalist Migration from East Florida to the Bahama Islands." 123-141: Peters. "The American
Loyalists in the Bahama Islands," 226-240; Wilbur Henry Siebert. The Legacy of the American Revolution
to the British West Indies and the Bahamas: A Chapter out of the History of the American Loyalists (1913:
reprint, Boston: Gregg Press, 1972): Johnson. Race Relations in the Bahamas, 1784-1834: Saunders.
Bahamian Loyalists and their Slaves: Thelma Peters, "The American Loyalists and the Plantation Period in
the Bahama Islands" (Thesis, University of Florida. 1960), Christopher Estol Michael Curry, "Liberty
Extended, Liberty Denied: The Black Loyalist Quest for Freedom in the Bahamas'" (Ph.D. diss.. University
of Connecticut. 2011); W. H. James, Exuma: The Loyalist Years, 1783-1834 (Nassau. The Bahamas: Media

74

significantly to historical scholarship on how the Loyalist Diaspora completely
transformed Bahamian society. Saunders focuses primarily on the long term social
transformation caused by the influx of the slave and free black populations, who
permanently settled many islands and towns, and consequently impacted the archipelago
at a deeper level than the refugee white planters and merchants. 7 Riley conversely draws
attention to the plight of the Loyalist refugees, how Andrew Deveaux's 227-man Loyalist
militia managed to outmaneuver 600 Spanish troops to retake the islands in April 1783,
and how the refugees strove to secure themselves financially through acquiring new lands
to establish plantations and commercial businesses.
While the economic transformation of the Bahama Islands has been covered
widely by the Bahamian and American scholars, the political, social, and international
changes resulting from the Loyalists transformation are addressed differently. Yet,
scholarly research in these areas is strongly connected to the economic growth and
decline of cotton cultivation, slavery, and the plantation system. Saunders and Craton
both focus on how the planter class that emerged from the cotton boom significantly
influenced the Bahamian political sphere, particularly with regards to their push for
infrastructural improvements, the battle for greater representation within the General
Assembly, and their resistance to emancipation in the British Atlantic World. The
international aspect of the Loyalists' influence has centered principally on the futile
struggle to maintain slavery against the forces of emancipation. Scholarly focus on white
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Loyalist immigrants and refugees looks at the short term cultural and material impact
between the early 1780s and the early 1830s, and how it fell away after the Loyalist
departure in the 1830s. However, scholars such as Gail Saunders who focus their
attention on the African and Creole populations that arrived during the 1780s look at their
lasting cultural contributions, since these groups remained on the islands long after the
abolition of slavery in the British Empire. 8
Scholars have traditionally addressed the effects of the Loyalists on the Bahamas
as being a "transformation." It is more accurately imagined as a "Loyalist Revolution."
This revolution changed the nature of the colony from its pre-Revolution stasis to a loyal,
booming frontier society, which lasted for half a century until the abolition of slavery on
August 1 st , 1834.

Loyalist refugees had experienced the brutality of the rebels and Continental
forces, who forced them from their homes, destroyed farmlands and businesses,
confiscated personal property, and slaughtered friends and family members. These
Loyalist refugees sought revenge against the American rebels and their sympathizers,
while many of the Bahamians sought to capitalize on a steady stream of unescorted
merchant vessels that could be easily captured and plundered. Consequently the
Bahamian-American trade fostered by the Continental Congress' benevolent trade policy
could not be tolerated by Loyalists and British-Bahamian patriots.
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While the Bahamians' economic interactions with the American rebels helped
many islanders to survive the famines sweeping the archipelago, it also provided them
with ample opportunities to take revenge on the open seas. The steady flow of American
commercial ships traveling through Bahamian waters, combined with the archipelago's
numerous hiding spaces, enabled Loyalists and Bahamians to launch privateering raids
against the rebels. The increase of privateering enterprises against American, French, and
Spanish shipping brought a wealth of prizes into the Bahamas that improved the situation
of many islanders attempting to survive during the conflict.
The return of privateering as an entrepreneurial industry in the Bahamas aided in
boosting the prosperity of the inhabitants during the poverty and famine conditions that
the Imperial Crisis and American Revolution caused. Letters from Governor John
Maxwell regarding Nassau's Vice Admiralty court list a total of "37 American vessels"
that were "Captured and Libelled" by June 30 th , 1780. 9 This number would be revised in
April 1782 to include a staggering total of "127 rebel ships"-amounting to ninety vessels
captured over the course of nearly two years. 10 Bahamian privateers targeted merchant
vessels with "great execution," and dealt financial distress to "the Traders of Cuba, the
Capes, and the Rebels." 11 The numbers of privateer vessels in operation in the Bahamas
reached a point where Maxwell had to request that a frigate be stationed in the colony to
"keep the Privateersmen in Order." 12 The number of American vessels, crews, and goods
taken by Bahamian privateers was so great Maxwell was "unable to 'keep or Victual
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them,"' and consequently had little choice but to return "them to the nearest American
port and turn them loose." 13
Yet, the aggressive actions taken by the privateers were not about to be left
unanswered. As Bahamian privateers increasingly prowled the shipping lanes they
unintentionally overextended the colony's hand as the British naval presence dwindled in
the West Indies following Lord Cornwallis' defeat at the Battle of Yorktown. The
Continental Congress, fed up with the Bahamian privateers and the establishment of a
"military government," brought an end to its trading relationship with the Bahamians in
1779. 14 The ravaging of American and Spanish vessels goaded them into a combined
military assault against the privateer nest of New Providence Island.
The departure of the Royal Navy left the colony exposed to attack from Spanish
and American forces. Spanish forces under the direction of Bernardo de Galvez had been
slowly amassing in Cuba and St. Dominigue throughout 1781 in preparation for an attack
on the heart of the Bahamas. By April 22 nd , 1782, the attack on New Providence was
underway. Yet instead of a sole Spanish force being commanded by Galvez, a joint
Spanish-American force consisting of fifty-nine vessels, "twelve of which were
American merchantmen" transformed into "armed privateers," were lead by the Governor
of Havana Juan de Cagigal and Commander Alexander Gillon of South Carolina. 15 The
ground force under Governor Cagigal's command consisted of approximately "2,000
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soldiers," a crushing force nearly twelve times the size of the 170 British soldiers
garrisoned on the island. 16
Faced with an overwhelming Spanish and America force, Governor Maxwell's
decision to surrender the islands without firing a shot was a prudent short-term
calculation. The preceding naval assaults against New Providence from the Continental
Navy and the Providence impressed upon both the government and inhabitants the
vulnerability of the Bahama Islands to hostile takeover-even with a small enemy force of
one ship or a few hundred men. Surrounded on all sides by a superior naval force of 59
ships, the colonial capital faced certain annihilation if it attempted to resist. 17
Yet, American ships were not the only targets of both the Loyalists and
Bahamians' wrath. Governor John Maxwell's surrender of the islands on May 6 th , 1782
to the detested forces of Catholic Spain without a fight enraged many Loyalist refugees
and Bahamian settlers. The residents of the archipelago found themselves under the rule
of both Catholicism and an ally of the American rebels, who had driven them into exile
and upset the political stability of the colony through invasions and illicit trading. For
over a year the remaining colonists and Loyalists lived under "the insults and Calamities
inseparable from Despotic power" of Don Antonio Claraco before the archipelago was
retaken by Captain Andrew Deveaux on April 17 th , 1783. 18
In addition to his surrendering of the colony to Catholic Spain, Governor Maxwell
enraged the newly settled refugees by continuing to permit the Americans to sell
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provisions to the colony. Even after the conclusion of the Revolution, the Bahamas
continued to experience severe food shortages. To alleviate the crisis Maxwell resorted to
a traditional and sensible approach-at least to the old inhabitants-of opening Nassau as a
free port, and allowing for the importation of "Indian corn" in American vessels. 19 Much
to the bewilderment of the old inhabitants, the Loyalist refugees rioted in the summer of
1784, attempted to strike down the American colors, and proceeded to smuggle
desperately needed provisions out of the colony. 20
Threats of serious repercussions aimed at deterring further outlandish behavior
from the Loyalists only goaded them further into opposing Governor Maxwell. While this
brought an end to the riots, it was quickly replaced by "writing libels," "disloyalty,
licentiousness, and anarchy," and the rise of the "Board of American Loyalists" in
opposition to Maxwell. 21 Loyalist disfavor toward the governor began to escalate rapidly,
and by September 20 th , 1784 the board publically petitioned King George III to have
Maxwell removed, arguing that he "had taken the government upon himself, oppressed
the Loyalists, refused to seize American vessels," and came to the Bahamas "only to
make money." 22 Hostilities came to a head during a meeting between the board and the
governor on September 3 rd , when the board "almost accused" Maxwell of "partiality and
incompetence" to his face. 23 Fed up with the libelous cacophony from the Loyalist

IM

Riley. Homeward Bound. 160-161.
Governor Maxwell to Lord Sidney, May 17, 1784, C.O, 23/25/103-104.

"Writing Libels," C.O. 23/25/108-112: Riley, Homeward Bound. 161; Handbill, C.O. 23/26/96; James
Hepburn. Handbill. July 26. 1784. C.O. 23/25/148.
" Riley. Homeward Bound, 162-163. Also see: Petition for Maxwell's Removal. C.O. 23/26/170-1 71.
Craton. A History of the Bahamas. 167.

80

inhabitants, and confronted with a serious lack of food and material aid from the
metropole, Governor Maxwell resigned in February 1785 to retire to a life of quiet
comfort in England.
The rapidly increasing Loyalist population on settled islands, the settlement of
uninhabited islands, and the establishment of new towns challenged the existing
distribution of representation within the colonial government. This strained political
relations within the Bahamian political system as the Loyalists pushed for greater
representation in the Lower House. The General Election of 1784 saw Exuma, Abaco,
Andros, Long Island, and Cat Island represented for the first time with a combined
delegation of eleven representatives-at least nine of whom were "virulent Loyalists."
Yet, the New Providence, Eleuthera, and Harbour Island delegations lost ten members,
falling from twenty-four to fourteen, despite New Providence having a "total British
population of 2,750 individuals" in 1782. 24 The newly elected minority Loyalist faction
proceeded to challenge the legitimacy of the reigning "Old Guard" through allegations
that the Provost Marshall, John Baker, had "arbitrarily declared six established settlers
elected" for Nassau and western New Providence despite the Loyalist candidates
receiving a majority of the votes. 25
Tensions continued to escalate between the increasingly radical Loyalist faction
and the Old Guard inhabitants and representatives. The assembly's refusal to read several
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petitions submitted by the Loyalists resulted in seven Loyalist members, led by James
Hepburn, to withdraw from the Lower House. John Petty and Peter Dean, two of the
seven absent representatives, published a scathing pamphlet in late April 1785 that
"incensed those...in the House," and caused the Speaker to order a copy to be "burnt
publicly" in front of the Courthouse-in addition to censuring the printer John Wells. 26
With tensions approaching a flashpoint, the situation was defused by detailed
instructions from London advising Governor Powell to suspend James Hepburn, Robert
Johnson, and John Wells from the assembly, and to resist calls for a new election. The
Old Guard majority in the assembly took further measures against the "recalcitrant
Loyalists." The Lower House formally expelled Peter Dean, James Moss, and John Petty
on September 26 th for their roles in the petitions and protests, and proceeded to expel five
more radical Loyalist members three days later. This successfully defused the situation,
27

but the Loyalists continued to be a dominant political force of opposition afterwards.

While the Loyalist immigration hardened the ideological boundary between the
islands and the rebellious mainland during the latter half of the Revolution, the arrival of
new settlers and slaves caused an economic revolution. This affected the colony in three
crucial manners: (1) it enabled settlers to easily purchase land instead of having to be
granted the land by either the Lords Proprietors or the governor, (2) it caused increased
sums of capital to flow into the colony from new Loyalist immigrants, and (3) the new
lands and capital led to the creation of a cotton staple crop economy.
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The termination of the long established land ownership restrictions materialized
from two important aspects of the Loyalist Diaspora. The first aspect consisted of the
increase in demand for land to establish farms and plantations by Loyalist settlers.
Beginning in the summer of 1783 the first organized mass migration of Loyalist refugees
began, but instead of coming from the Carolinas and Georgia they originated from New
York. From August to October 1783 "about fifteen hundred New Yorkers" made the
journey to Abaco Island in several groups. 28 The first "pioneer group" of 250 settlers and
95 "ostensibly free" blacks set sail on August 21 st and 23 rd , 1783, and was followed by at
least two larger groups totaling "941 settlers," including "217 men, 118 women, 203
children.. .and 403 'servants,'" in September and October. 29
Further sporadic waves of Loyalist refugees poured into the Bahamas from the
Canadian Maritimes, particularly Nova Scotia, and Spanish-controlled East Florida. Of
the 80,000 to 100,000 Loyalists who fled the new United States after 1783 approximately
4,000 to 7,300 people settled in the Bahamas between 1783 and 1789. These refugees had
originally fled from New York, South Carolina, and Georgia to quickly and affordably
settle under British governance by relocating to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and East
Florida. 30
Yet, a number of circumstances and international developments forced them to
relocate to the Bahamas. The two principal reasons behind this Loyalist relocation were:
Britain's cession of East Florida to Spain in the Treaty of Paris of 1783, and the cold
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Canadian climate's inhospitality to plantation agriculture. The cession of the Floridas to
Spain came as a shock to the British inhabitants and Loyalist refugees. Emotions of
abandonment and betrayal gripped the East Florida inhabitants and refugees, many whom
had "sacrificed Evry [sic] thing that is dear in life" and "freely bled" to now be deserted
by King and country once again. 31 Many residents of East Florida did not believe the
reports of the Florida cession and insisted on seeing the articles of the Treaty in print,
while John Cruden petitioned Spanish King Charles III in October 1784 on behalf of the
Loyalists settled between the St. Johns and St. Marys' Rivers to "allow them an 'internal
government.'" 32
Southern Loyalists found themselves faced with the possibility of having to settle
in Canada, where the climate was an antithesis to their former homes in the Carolinas and
Georgia, or the desolate Bahama Islands. The cold climate and rocky soil of the Canadian
Maritimes made little sense to southern Loyalists, who regarded its climate as "not being
calculated for Southern Constitutions, or for the employment of the Slaves." The sparsely
inhabited Bahamas were on a similar latitude to the Lower South and were far better
suited for the use of slavery than Canada. However, the soil was "far too poor to establish
sugar plantations...or to cultivate rice and tobacco" that southern Loyalists were
accustomed too. The Loyalists and East Floridians largely regarded the Bahamas as being
nothing more than "barren Rock[s]," which were "not initially appealing to [the] Floridabased refugees." An investigative mission to the archipelago conducted by Dr. Lewis
Johnston of St. Augustine during the summer of 1783 commented that the Out Islands
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were only visited for "wrecking Turtling and cutting Timber." While the barren, rocky
soil gave little hope of establishing prosperous staple-crop-producing plantations akin to
those in Tidewater Virginia, coastal South Carolina, Jamaica and Barbados, it did provide
slave-owning, southern Loyalists with the opportunity to fulfill a principal objective-it
was a "place where they could put their slaves to work" raking salt, harvesting native
tropical fruits, and experimenting with cotton cultivation. 33
The second important facet behind the Bahamian land reforms came with the
inexpensive prices of newly available land acquired from the Lords Proprietors by the
British Government. The low costs encouraged Loyalist refugees to settle on the Bahama
Islands, while enabling Bahamians to expand and develop farms and plantations
throughout the archipelago. Following the conclusion of the Revolution, the Crown
bought out the three remaining Lords Proprietors' claims on the remaining uncultivated
Bahamian lands between 1784 and 1787 for a "total payment of twenty-six thousand
pounds." 34 The buyout enabled the British and Bahamian governments to sell land,
conduct surveys, and maintain records of landownership on the islands, but it also gifted
lands to both Bahamians and Loyalist settlers. For the Loyalist refugees, "who on account
of their loyalty to his Majesty," were awarded "forty acres of land...for every person,
being master or mistress of a family" with an additional twenty acres for every "white
and black man, woman, or child, of which such family shall consist," but were exempted
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from paying quit rents for ten years. 35 Furthermore, Loyalist refugees were granted lands
"free of all expence [sic] whatever" at "his Majesty's Royal Will and Pleasure," while
long established Bahamians were subject to "an annual quit rent of two shillings per
hundred acres." 36
The sale of the Crown's newly acquired Bahamian lands significantly increased
the amount of cultivated land. Calculations made by William Wylly, an ardent Loyalist
and Solicitor General of the Bahamas, illustrate the dramatic growth of Bahamian
landownership by the end of the 1780s. Wylly's records show that by the conclusion of
the American Revolution the total area of cultivated land was equal to 3,434 acres, but by
1788 the area had increased almost fivefold to 16,322 acres. 37 Wylly's tabulations of
Bahamian expansion illustrate an era of grand expansion that was taking place, yet
modern scholarship indicates the extent of land purchases was in fact much greater
amounting to at least "43,000 acres" in "114 patents" for an "average of 382 acres." 38
The growth in land sales following the post-Revolution land reforms spurred the
development of plantation agriculture, which led to the expansion of the islands' cotton
trade. Loyalist refugees settling on the islands after 1783 began to establish cotton
plantations along the "south and southeastern islands...[of] Exuma, Long Island, Crooked
Island, and Acklins," and by the end of 1785 the plantations produced "124 tons of
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cotton" on approximately 2,476 acres.
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As demand for raw cotton increased dramatically

with the rapid industrialization of British textile manufacturing, exports of cotton
continued to increase steadily from 219 tons in 1787 to 442 tons in 1790, and finally
peaked at approximately 602 tons in 1810. 40 Estimates of the average yield of cotton was
roughly "112 pounds" per acre, with "exceptional plantations" harvesting up to "1,500
pounds...for each working slave." 41
The growth of cotton as a Bahamian cash crop was furthered by the development
of the cotton gin. The creation of various versions of the cotton gin, principally Joseph
Eve's "inanimately powered, self-feeding roller gin" in 1788, enabled slaves and planters
to remove the cotton seeds from the fiber more efficiently than if it had been done by
hand. 42 This permitted vast quantities of cotton to be produced, cleaned, and sold for
greater profits than before. Bahamian cotton planters quickly seized upon the new
technology, and within a year "mastered the gin's complexities." 43 In an article in the
Bahamas Gazette, "A Cotton Planter" analyzing "Eve's wind gin" concluded that the gin
yielded "250 lbs. per day" in cleaned cotton, and the saved equivalent of "eighteen
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hundred days" worth of the slave's labor. 44 The increased productivity of Eve's gin
allowed the slaves to better tend the cotton plants during the year, and enabled them to
raise an additional "two tons of cotton" in good years. 45 While land reforms, an influx of
new slaves and Loyalist capital, and the cotton gin made the Bahamas one of the largest
cotton producing colonies in the British West Indies, the peak production of 602 tons
paled in comparison to the 6,425,000 pounds being harvested annually in South Carolina
by 1800. 46
The cultivation of cotton provided Bahamian and Loyalist settlers with an
increasingly in-demand staple crop that could be produced more easily than salt for a
greater profit. The production of large quantities of salt necessary to produce significant
annual profits required "large operations and more capital," which put individual
ownership of a salt raking enterprise financially

out of reach for many planters and

islanders. Typical salt raking operations were owned and managed by a collective
corporation of local planters or individuals. This offered very little latitude for individual
stakeholders to rake and trade salt, because of the Bahamian government's increasing
desire to exert its control over the industry. Yet, many Loyalist immigrants and planters
entered into the salt raking industry as part of a corporation, or through creating small salt
ponds adjacent to their cotton plantations. Early theoretical estimates in 1802 put
Bahamian and Loyalist salt production at "three million bushels, or one hundred thousand
tons" annually, worth an "estimated £250,000," however in reality salt raking never
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produced more than half of these optimistic calculations. Nevertheless, the salt trade did
provided many planters with an additional source of income to their annual cotton
income, and brought additional revenue into the islands. 47
The development of Bahamian plantation agriculture did more than just produce a
long desired staple crop; it signaled a break with the long pattern of economic stasis that
characterized the colony's social and economical situation. During a four month
expedition to New Providence in 1783, German botanist and physician Johann David
Schoepf observed that the inhabitants continued to survive through traditional exports.
Yet, he noted that cotton was "one of the best and surest rewards of the planter's toil,"
since it thrived in the rocky soil and hot, rain-limited island climate. The islanders
Schoepf encountered on New Providence were mainly sailors and fisherman, with "real
planters" being of "lesser consequence." Nassau consisted of a collection of houses "all
lightly built and of simple construction" with walls made of "merely a plain covering of
boards," and "one tolerably regular street.. ..which runs next to the water." 48
The clearing of uncultivated island wilderness to create cotton plantations and
small farms also caused an increase in Bahamian logging and timber sales, and an
explosive growth in salt raking. On the eve of the American Revolution logging
competed with salt for the principal export of the colony, but the total revenues generated
by these products only amounted to approximately £5,216 in 1774. However, by 1787 the
value of Bahamian exports had increased over eleven-fold to £58,707, and the amount of
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land under cultivation increased "twelve times" to approximately "thirty-five hundred
acres" of which 8,000 acres were devoted to cotton production. 49
The establishment of cotton plantations throughout the "cotton belt" between Cat
Island and Acklin's Island turned Bahamian and Loyalist farmers from debtors into
colonial "cotton barons." Exiled Georgian and South Carolinian planters settling in this
region began to cultivate extra long staple, Sea Island Cotton. This would prove to be a
shrewd decision, since the region's climate was ideal for the cultivation of extra long
staple cotton, and would "prove to be a bonanza for Loyalist planters." 50 The financial
impact of the cotton boom was illustrated by Oswell Eve, a pioneering settler of Cat
Island, who noted in May 1784 that a planter brought into "debt and ruin" by the
American Revolution relocated to Long Island with six slaves to grow cotton, and six
years later had produced enough cotton "to establish a fortune of £5-6000." 51
The decade following the revolution was particularly kind to the Bahamas as they
became more integrated into the reorganized British Atlantic economy. The emergence of
cotton plantations, highly profitable cotton and hardwood exports, the establishment of
Nassau as an economic free port in 1787 despite Loyalist opposition, and the influx of
displaced Loyalists with "expanded needs and more refined tastes" precipitated an
importation boom. While Bahamian imports were limited in number during the Imperial
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Crisis, the post-Revolutionary era saw a "forty-fold increase" from roughly £3,400 to a
staggering £136,359 in 1787. 52
The explosion of commercial trade, agricultural development, and economic
wealth that the Loyalist immigration brought to the Bahamas manifested itself initially in
infrastructure improvements. The emerging Bahamian planter class pushed for the
construction of public roads and the application of the philosophy, common in all
plantation colonies, that landowners maintained responsibility for the upkeep of the roads
adjacent to their property. Road construction spurred New Providence and the other
principal islands to build major highways, with the Long Island highway reportedly being
100 miles long. Beginning with Lord Dunmore, who assumed the governorship in
October 1787, there was a massive expansion of the colony's public works projects that
continued until the War of 1812. Major undertakings were made to increase the
fortifications on New Providence, resulting in the construction of Fort Charlotte in 1789,
Fort Fincastle in 1793, and a separate array of batteries on Hog Island and Potter's Cay.
Additionally, Lord Dunmore's analysis of the conditions of the chambers, residences, and
offices of the colonial government initiated the construction of a new "House of
Assembly, Council Chamber, Courthouse and Gaol" between 1796 and 1812. 53
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The immigration of loyalist planters and merchants from the American mainland
and neighboring Bahamian islands to Nassau created a duality in the physical appearance
of the colonial capital's residencies. The predominately "all-wood houses... of unpainted
timber bleached gray" soon gave way to an increasing number of the "characteristic
'Loyalist' townhouse" consisting of a "stone shell encased...by elegant woodwork." A
typical Loyalist townhouse produced an air of planter class refinement in the backwater
colony, with amenities such as: wooden piazza galleries, central stone staircases with
upper galleries, glass window panes, plastered walls, and pastel colored exteriors. The
Loyalist influence on Bahamian architecture "lasted for at least a century" with a number
of principal estates, such as "Greycliff, Jacaranda, and Cascadilla," being built during the
mid-nineteenth century. 54
The infrastructural improvements and exponential increase in trade and prosperity
took the Bahamas from a ramshackle outpost of the British Atlantic World to a
"civilized" colony in merely twenty years. Yet, as Michael Craton and Gail Saunders
both observe, this economic transformation was temporary, and "faded with the
knowledge that neither cotton nor any other plantation crop" would continuously provide
for a "baronial lifestyle" in the same manner that tobacco and sugar did for Virginia,
South Carolina, Jamaica, Barbados, Brazil, and Cuba. 55 The prospects for wealth and
leisure created by the international cotton boom were rapidly evaporating with social
upheaval, and calls for a socio-racial justice by emancipating the slaves throughout the

additional barracks in 1794. This brought the total expenditures on fortifications up to an astronomical
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British Empire. A third revolution would be the final blow to the wealth and colonial
grandeur created by the Loyalist Revolution, and restore the Bahamas to much of its prior
way of life.

The gradual decline of the Bahamian cotton trade began after 1810 when
production peaked at 602 tons, and continued until the industry completely collapsed in
1838-four years following the end of slavery. The end of Bahamian prosperity resulted
from a number of political and social events, which were fundamentally tied to cotton
cultivation, the plantation system, and the global cotton trade. Beginning as early as
1788, the gradual depletion of minerals in the thin layers of fertile soil by years of cotton
production resulted in increasingly smaller yields per year. The prosperity of the cotton
plantation system in the Bahamas was also threatened by the emancipation movement,
which exchanged slavery to apprenticeships and paid labor with its implementation in
1834. With the decline of cotton and the end of slavery, the archipelago gradually
returned to its previous impoverished state.
Depletion of soil nutrients necessary for large-scale, yearly cotton production
began early in the post-Revolutionary Bahamas. Bahamian planters and officials
observed in 1788 that the "cotton production fell drastically" below what had been
originally forecasted. 36 This was originally attributed to the onslaught of a cotton
consuming "chenille bug," a type of "caterpillar.. .variegated with beautiful colours and
many legs" capable of destroying whole fields of cotton plants by consuming merely the

? "lbid..
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plant's leaves. 57 In 1794, the chenille bugs devoured roughly two-thirds of the Bahamian
cotton crop, and four years later "almost demolished the crop" entirely. 58 However, as the
years progressed it became evident that the "real and lasting reasons" for the crop's
failure was due to the "inadequacy of Bahamian soil." 59
Cotton soon faded into the economic backdrop, becoming a spoke in a diversified
economy instead of the driving engine that it once was in the late eighteenth century. This
left many planters in financial ruin, and'forced many to abandon their plantations to
either seek their fortunes elsewhere or immigrate to Britain. Yet, those who remained in
the archipelago survived by turning to longstanding Bahamian industries. The salt raking
industry continued to be a major source of income, exporting 4,870,253 bushels of salt
from Turks Island to North American and the other British colonies between 1794 and
1805. As a result, the significant amount of salt being exported brought between £1,000
and £9,000 in annual tax revenue from 1802 to 1827. 60
The rise of the emancipation movement in Britain threatened the "hard-won
improvements" made by the Bahamas' planter and merchant classes, because it stood to
eliminate the supply of cheap slave labor that Bahamian plantations and industries
depended upon. The economy created by the Loyalist Revolution was threatened by a
new imperial revolution. In order to maintain the wealth and social status generated by

^ Ibid., 196; Saunders, Slavery in the Bahamas, 44n44: Lewis A. Dodge. "The Cotton Caterpillar," The
American Naturalist 7, no. 4 (April. 1873): 213-216.
Saunders. "Slavery and Cotton Culture in the Bahamas," 130.
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the chattel labor system, the planters fought the oncoming emancipation movement
"because they knew that it meant the destruction of most of what they stood for." 61
While much of the merchant and planter classes pushed to maintain slavery, the
winds of abolition and black-male suffrage had been blowing in the colony since Lord
Dunmore's administration. Within two days of arriving in the Bahamas, Lord Dunmore
issued a "proclamation relative to Negroes" offering a "general pardon to fugitive
Blacks" who claimed they were "free Blacks from America," who had been abducted by
Loyalists settlers intending to sell them to the French on Hispaniola. 62 The decline of the
cotton boom and Bahamian plantations, and the natural increase of the existing slave
population, consequently made the importation of African slaves unnecessary. 63 In 1804
and 1807, the colonial government permitted free blacks to serve in the colonial militia
and vote in elections. 64 The gradual liberalization of manumission laws and practices
between 1800 and 1830 led to a "great increase" in the number of free blacks in the
Bahamas, as well as a greater social acceptance of slaves purchasing their freedom
instead of the master paying a "manumission fee of £90." 65
A series of slave acts and regulations passed by the General Assembly during the
1820s redefined the practice of slavery in the archipelago. These acts defined for the first
time what a "master's obligations to his slaves were," specifying that every slave over ten
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years old was to receive a "peck of ground corn" per week and two sets of clothes per
year. Slaves were allotted a portion of land adjacent to their houses on which they could
cultivate vegetables, and granted permission to freely trade dry goods; however, the
colonial legislature expressly prohibited them from cultivating cotton, raising cattle, or
raking salt unless permitted by their masters. By 1827, the colony criminalized the
breaking up of slave families through sales and trading, and disallowed children under the
age of fourteen from being separated from their parents. Further changes in the Bahamian
slave laws in 1822, 1827, and 1829 allowed slaves to give testimony in court for all civil
cases except those dealing with libel or slave ownership, provided they were Christian
and deemed to be in good character. 66
With the end of the Bahamian cotton boom and the exodus of many Loyalist
families, the Bahamas was left in a situation that was both old and new. The diminishing
wealth generated by the Loyalist Revolution's economic transformation slowly returned
the colony to the economic rhythm of prosperity and poverty, highlighted by a return to
smuggling and piracy during periods of international crisis, typified by the preRevolutionary era.

The Loyalist influx instigated a revolution. The dramatic increase in population
and demand for land to establish farms and plantations contributed to the implementation
of much needed land reform, challenged the political environment, and hardened the
boundaries of the reconfigured Atlantic world. The arrival of the Loyalist refugees
transformed the backwater archipelago into a booming cotton colony, which brought in

""Ibid.. 196-197.
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wealth and trade. The increase of settlers and slaves, coupled with the sale of lands held
by the Lords Proprietors, expanded the number of towns and settled islands, and
increased the representation of the Out Islands in the assembly.
Of the transformations that permanently affected the islands, the change in the
racial composition of the colony was one of the most significant. The large influx of
slaves and free blacks with the Loyalist Diaspora dramatically increased the black
population from 2,201 in 1773 to over 10,002 by 1834. 67 Blacks remained in the
Bahamas, even after the end of the cotton boom drove many white settlers to seek
prosperity elsewhere. The introduction of black-male suffrage in 1807 and the land
reforms enabled free blacks to own their own farmlands and vote in local elections.
While the collapse of the Bahamian cotton trade dealt a major blow to the colony's
economy, the growth of the salt trade made up for some of the lost revenue and created a
strong export industry. However, it could not fully replace the wealth generated by the
cotton boom, and the separation of the Turks and Caicos Islands from the Bahamas in
1848 dealt further damage the Bahamian economy. After experiencing over sixty years of
transformative revolutions that shook the colony, the islands sank back into an economic
struggle for survival.
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